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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem Delineated
Loss of a loved one, though a universal experience, is never easy. The loss
is particularly poignant and difficult to bear when it is one's own child who has
died. Yet even more horrifying is the situation facing close family members
when one of their number lies in the condition that has come to be described as a
"persistent vegetative state" (PVS)-a death-in-life, where vital organs may con-
tinue to function, but consciousness has been irretrievably lost, and the brain has
ceased to function on all but the most primitive level.' The fact that persons in
this condition can frequently be kept alive for indeterminate periods of time
through technological means2 has in recent years prompted both court decisions 3
and legislation4 often described as defining a "right to die."5 This concept refers
primarily to the right of a competent adult to execute advance directives that
either specify the limits of life-sustaining measures the person would wish to see
1. See generally Ronald E. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical
Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 27. Unlike
whole brain death, the persistent vegetative state is a condition in which the brain stem, or
lower center of the brain, which controls such vegetative functions as respiration and primitive
reflexes (for example, the pupillary response to light) remains relatively intact. Higher cerebral
functions cease. Id. at 27. Persons in a persistent vegetative state have sleep-wake cycles but
are totally unaware of themselves and their surroundings. Id at 28. It is estimated that there are
5,000-10,000 PVS patients in the United States, and the number is expected to grow. Id at 31.
See also William M. Feinberg & Peggy C. Ferry, A Fate Worse Than Death: The Persistent
Vegetative State in Childhood, 138 AM. J. OF DISEASES OF CHILDREN 128 (1984) (dealing
specifically with diagnosis of persistent vegetative state in children and advocating early
discontinuation of life support "if the situation is truly hopeless." Id. at 130).
2. Given adequate nutrition and hydration, these patients may survive for a number of
years; one documented survival was 37 years, 111 days. Cranford, The Medical Reality, supra
note 1, at 31.
3. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, RIGHT-TO-DIE COURT DECISIONS, Vol. 1 (1987),
VoL II (1987-1989), and Vol. 111 (1990- ) [hereinafter, RIGHT-TO-DIE COURT DECISIONS]
currently contain "Fact Sheets" analyzing 67 significant court decisions in the area. This
quarterly subscription service regularly lists numerous other cases, some of which are
unreported. See, e.g., CHOICE IN DYING, RIGHT-TO-DIE CASE & STATUTORY CITATIONS:
STATE-BY-STATE LISTING (June 23, 1992) [hereinafter CASE & STATUTORY CITATIONS].
Choice in Dying is the successor organization to Concern for Dying and the Society for the
Right to Die. Its board chairman has described it as "a patient advocacy organization working
to improve the way we die in America," and defined its mission as "improving the conditions
in which people spend the last days of their lives." Evan R. Collins, Jr., Choice in Dying
Renews Commitment to Its Mission, 1 CHOICE IN DYING NEWS 1 (Spring 1992). In addition to
its publishing activities, the non-profit corporation regularly consults with legislators,
attorneys, health care providers, and patients and their families to help promote and preserve
the rights of individuals to control treatment decisions. See generally id.; SOCIETY FOR THE
RIGHT TO DIE, IN SUPPORT OF DYING WrTH DIGNITY (1988) (brochure).
4. See SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION
(1991) [hereinafter REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION] (containing over 70 statutes,
consisting of all state legislation pertaining to advance directives, durable powers of attorney,
and surrogate health care decision-making, updated as of October 1991). Choice in Dying,
successor to the Society, regularly updates this compendium through its subscription service,
supra note 3.
5. In his opinion for the Court in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 277 (1990), Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, "This is the first case in which we have been
squarely presented with the issue of whether the United States Constitution grants what is in
common parlance referred to as a 'right to die."' The terminoloy is also reflected in the name,




utilized in the event of certain terminal conditions or permanent loss of con-
sciousness,6 or else name a person or persons empowered to make such deci-
sions.7 An increasing number of jurisdictions are also passing surrogate/family
decision-making statutes, designating in preferential order individuals who may
make medical decisions for a patient who has failed to execute a valid advance
directive, including decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment.8
In the highly visible case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,9 the United States Supreme Court entertained arguments, accepted by a
number of state courts, that federal constitutional guarantees give incompetent
patients the right to have others make refusal-of-treatment decisions for them
when they have failed to make their wishes known while competent.10 In his
1990 opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that "[tihe princi-
ple that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions,"'1
and, for purposes of the decision, assumed "that the United States Constitution
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse
lifesaving hydration and nutrition."12 Nonetheless, the majority in Cruzan held
that the state of Missouri, relying on its "interest in the protection and
preservation of human life,"13 could prohibit the termination of medical treatment
for a PVS patient, absent clear and convincing evidence that such would be her
wishes.
Although Cruzan was hailed for its recognition of a constitutionally pro-
tected right to forego unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment, 14 it was also
6. As of June 1992, 47 states and the District of Columbia had "living will" or
"natural death" statutes, which permit individuals to specify in writing their wishes about the
use of artificial life support. REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at Intro.-l;
CHOICE IN DYING, LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, MARCH 1992-JUNE 1992 (June 24, 1992);
CHOICE IN DYING, STATE LAW GOVERNING LIVING WILLS/DECLARATIONS AND
APPOINTMENT OFA HEALTH CARE AGENT (Feb. 26, 1992) (chart).
7. As of June 1992, 46 states and the District of Columbia had enacted statutes which
specifically permit individuals to designate others to make medical decisions for them,
including decisions concerning the withholding or withdrawal of artificial means of life
support. In two additional states, general durable power of attorney statutes have been
construed by court decisions, Attorney General opinions, or by other statutes to permit the
making of such medical decisions. CHOICE IN DYING, STATE LAW GOVERNING DURABLE
POWER OF ATTORNEY, HEALTH CARE AGENTS, PROXY APPOINTMENTS (June 23, 1992)
(chart).
8. As of June 1992, 20 states and the District of Columbia had such statutes, while in
three additional states, court decisions had interpreted existing laws to permit surrogate
decision-making, including termination of care decisions. REFUSAL OF TREATMENT
LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at Intro.-2; CHOICE IN DYING, STATUTES AUTHORIZING
SURROGATE/FAMILY DECISIONMAKING (June 23, 1992). See infra notes 20-21 .and
accompanying text.
9. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
10. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647 (NJ. 1976), cert denie4 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 426
N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Ct. C. P. Summit County Prob. Div. 1980); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738
(Wash. 1983).
11. 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990).
12. 497 U.S. at 279.
13. Id. at 280.
14. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Securing Patients' Right to Refuse Medical Care: In
Praise of the Cruzan Decision, 92 AM. L MED. 307 (1992) (asserting that the Supreme Court
"clearly strengthened" the rights of competent and incompetent patients); John Kenneth
1993]
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
damned for its limitations. 15 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens lamented,
'The Court's decision affords no protection to children, to young people who are
victims of unexpected accidents or illnesses, or to the countless thousands of
elderly persons who either fail to decide, or fail to explain, how they want to be
treated if they should experience a similar fate."16
In the wake of the decision, there has been a flurry of state legislative
activity aimed primarily at easing the means for competent persons to issue valid
advance directives.17 In addition, a new federal law requires health care providers
to install institutional policies regarding advance directives, to inform patients
about their rights under state law, and to document whether or not patients have
directives.' 8 Evidence of increased public interest in taking advantage of these
measures is strong.19 Nevertheless, the flaw noted by Justice Stevens remains,
Gisleson, Commentary, Right to Die, Forced to Live: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 401 (1991) (suggesting that the Court's
holding could serve as a springboard for broader decisions in the future); L. Gregory Pawlson,
Impact of the Cruzan Case on Medical Practice, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 69, 70
(1991) ("Cruzan has reinforced the physicians' duty to respect self determination by
competent persons in making health care decisions. A further positive result has been the
increased awareness by both physicians and patients of the need to discuss issues related to the
use of life sustaining treatments") [Dr. Pawlson also sharply criticized the decision's failings,
however; see infra note 15]; Otto Friedrich, A Limited Right to Die: the Court Affirms the
Principle, but Not for Nancy Cruzan, TIME, July 9, 1990, at 59 (noting right-to-die advocates'
approval of the Court's recognition of right to refuse medical treatment, including artificial
nutrition and hydration; this article also considers some experts' reservations about the
decision, see infra note 15); Linda Greenhouse, Liberty to Reject Life: Court Decision to
Protect the Right to Die Marks Opening of a Constitutional Frontier, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
1990, at A16.
15. See, e.g., Larry Gostin, Life and Death Choices After Cruzan, 19 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 9 (1991); Patricia A. King, The Authority of Families to Make Medical
Decisions for Incompetent Patients after the Cruzan Decision, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 76 (1991); Tracy E. Miller, Public Policy In the Wake of Cruzan: a Case Study of New
York's Health Care Proxy Law, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 360, 365 (1990); Pawlson,
supra note 14, at 70 ("[Ihe Court's narrow focus for its decision, and the resultant failure to
limit the power of states to intrude on medical decision-making, have substantially damaged,
rather than helped, decision-making regarding life sustaining treatment"); Fenella Rouse,
Advance Directives: Where Are We Heading After Cruzan?, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE
353 (1990); David 0. Stewart, Right to Die, But ..., A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 36; Friedrich,
supra note 14; Ellen Goodman, The High-Tech Twilight Zone, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 28,
1990, at 15; Tamar Lewin, Despite Daughter's Death, Parents Pursue Right-to-Die Case,
N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1991, at A14. See generally, Symposium, Medical Decision-Making and
the "Right to Die" after Cruzan, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 5-104 (1991).
16. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 339, accord, Gostin, supra note 15, at 10.
17. REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 4, Intro. (1991). When this
compendium appeared in the spring of 1991, plans were simultaneously announced for its
update, which was published in the fall, along with a list of changes in 27 states. CHOICE IN
DYING, REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION: UPDATE FOR 1991; Paul Katzeff, States Go
to Work after Cruzan, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 24, 1990, at 16 (noting the increase in durable power-
of-attorney statutes, specifically, which may be perceived as preferable to living will statutes
because the designated decision-maker can guard against abuse of the incompetent patient's
rights).
18. The Patient Self-Determination Act, part of the 1990 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act, took effect on December 1, 1991. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(1990).
19. See, e.g., Doloes Kong, Final Wishes: Court Ruling Spurs Rise in Living Wills,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 1990, at I (reporting, inter alia, that the Society for the Right to Die
and Concern for Dying had sent out more than 400,000 forms for advance directives since
Cruzan was handed down on June 25, 1990); Jill Smolowe, Bringing an End to Limbo: A
Missouri Court Affirms Nancy Cruzan's Right to Die After Hearing "Clear and Convincing"
Evidence to Support the Move, TIME, Dec. 24, 1990, at 64 (noting, "While the Cruzans' legal
[VOL. 35
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particularly with respect to patients who are minors. Even where laws permit
designated surrogates to make medical decisions for incompetent patients who
have never voiced their preferences, the legislation may either specifically
exclude minors2o or else fail to specify that its protections extend to minors as
well as to adults.21 As a result, if a child falls into a persistent vegetative state, it
is often unclear who has authority to make decisions about her care, what
liabilities health care facilities may incur, and whether judicial intervention is
required before treatment can be terminated. Loving parents may be unable to
bring closure to a nightmare that precludes the possibility of even the normal
grieving process facing those who lose a child-at least, not without resort to
time-consuming and costly legal procedures that only add to an already
overwhelming emotional burden2
Although courts and commentators alike sometimes point to the paucity of
cases on the issue as evidence that withdrawal-of-treatment decisions for children
odyssey is ending, their struggle has persuaded many Americans to seek to avoid the same
fate. Since the Supreme Court decision, right-to-die advocates report that inquiries about living
wills have surged 550-fold").
20. Five states have surrogate decision-making statutes that fall into this category.
Arizona, Arizona Living Wills and Health Care Directives Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
3231 (Supp. 1992); Colorado, Colorado Proxy Decision-Makers for Medical Treatment Act,
1992 Colo. Legis. Serv. 321 (West), COLO. REV. STAT. §15-18.5-101 to -103 (Supp. 1992);
Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.08(A)(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1991); Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-1105(2) (Supp. 1992); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie
Supp. 1992), as amended by 1992 Va. Acts ch. 748. In Ohio, Utah, and Virginia, these statutes
contain "preservation of rights" clauses, specifying that their provisions do not affect any other
legal rights that persons may have to effect termination of life support systems. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2133.12(C)(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1117(4) (Michie Supp. 1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2992 (1991) (referring specifically to "a minor or incompetent patient").
The nature of these "other legal rights" is not clear.
• 21. The following 13 jurisdictions have ambiguously worded statutes with general
language which may or may not authorize medical decision-making to withhold or withdraw
life support systems for minors: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571 (West Supp.
1992); the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210 (1989); Florida, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 765.401 (West Supp. 1993); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-21 (Supp. 1991), as
interpreted by In re Crabtree, No. 86-0031 (Haw. Fam. Ct. 1st Cir. Apr. 26, 1990); Iowa,
IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West 1989); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-707
(West Supp. 1991); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-107(d) (1990 & Supp.
1991), as interpreted by 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 88-046; Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106
(1991); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.626 (1991); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90--
322 (1990 & Supp. 1991); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635 (1991); South Carolina, S.C.
CODE ANN. §44--66-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. §§ 3-5-
209(b), 35-22-105(b) (1992). The language of the Uniform Rights of the Terminally In Act is
also ambiguous. Unif. Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, § 7, 9B U.L.A. 96 (Supp. 1989). Only
six states specifically provide that designated persons may make decisions to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment on behalf of minors: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-
214 (Michie 1991); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2 para. 851-25 (Supp. 1992); Indiana,
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-4 (Bums 1990 & Supp. 1992), as interpreted by In re Lawrance,
579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.6 (West Supp.
1992); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-4 (Michie 1991); and Texas, TEX. HEALTH &
SAFErY CODEANN. § 672.006 (West Supp. 1992).
22. See, e.g., In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (parents' petition
for withdrawal of treatment for infant in persistent vegetative state); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d
716 (Ga. 1984) (same); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982) (same); In re Swan, 569
A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990) (parents petitioned as court-appointed guardians on behalf of 18-year-
old son, a PVS patient injured in auto accident at age 17). See also Griffith v. Florida, 548
So. 2d 244, 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (first-degree murder defendant shot and killed his
three-year-old daughter, lying in her hospital bed in a persistent vegetative state, because "I
didn't want her to suffer anymore"; the primary defense was insanity).
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in a persistent vegetative state are routinely handled as private matters between
parents and treating physicians,23 we must not allow the undoubted truth of this
assertion to cloud our remembrance of tragic counter examples. While Nancy
Cruzan's case was awaiting argument in the Supreme Court, a desperate Rudolfo
Linares entered Chicago's Rush-Presbyterian-St. Lukes Medical Center and
brandished a gun to keep hospital staff at bay in the pediatric intensive care unit
while he disconnected his six-month-old son, Sammy, from a mechanical
ventilator and held the child in his arms until the infant died.24 The hospital,
particularly its attorney, was commonly criticized for failure to obtain the legal
help that was universally assumed available for resolving the situation without
such violence.25 Nonetheless, the fact remains that the hospital's refusal to
disconnect the respirator at Mr. Linares' request was predicated on a perception
of potential civil and criminal liability if it acted without court order26-a
perception shared by some commentators, 27 despite the lack of prosecutions in
such situations.28 The same considerations have impelled other institutions to
require court orders before acting on parents' wishes, in proceedings that have
sometimes reached the appellate level. 29 Within months of the Linares incident,
the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the need for a court order prior to
withdrawal of artificial life support from an incompetent patient.30
23. See, e.g., ALAN MEISEL, TBE RIGHT TO DIE § 1.4 (1989 & Supp. 1991) ("most
right to die 'cases' are resolved in the clinical, rather than the judicial, setting"); id. § 13.6
("The number of [court] cases involving children is much smaller than that concerning adult
patients, which is probably explained by the lesser uncertainty about the authority of parents to
make such decisions for their minor children ...."); Larry Gostin, Editor's Introduction:
Family Privacy and Persistent Vegetative State, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 295, 296
(1989) (introduction to a symposium issue); Alan Meisel, Refusing Treatment, Refusing to
Talk, and Refusing to Let Go: On Whose Terms Will Death Occur?, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH.
CARE 221 (1989) ('Each day, hundreds, if not thousands, of decisions must be made about
administering or withholding life-sustaining treatment for critically ill patients" id. at 221);
Rouse, supra note 15, at 355 ("Conventional wisdom is that now perhaps 70 percent of all
deaths occur as the result of a decision to do or not to do something").
24. Gostin, supra note 23. See generally, Symposium, Family Privacy and PVS: A
Symposium on the Linares Case, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 295 (1989).
25. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 23, at 295-96; John D. Lantos et al., The Linares
Affair, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 308, 309 (1989); Lawrence J. Nelson & Ronald E.
Cranford, Legal Advice, Moral Paralysis and the Death of Samuel Linares, 17 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 316, 316-17 (1989); Could an Ethics Committee Have Prevented Linares
Tragedy?, 5 MED. ETHICS ADVISOR 69 (1989); Life-Support Withdrawal Creates Ethical,
Legal Dilemmas, AMER. HOSP. ASS'N NEWS, May 15, 1989, at 8.
26. Gilbert M. Goldman et al., What Actually Happened: An Informed Review of the
Linares Incident, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 298, 302-03 (1989).
27. MEISEL, supra note 23, § 13.6, at 422; Gostin, supra note 23, at 296.
28. Gostin, supra note 23, at 296. But see Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484
(Ct. App. 1983) (issuing writ of prohibition on behalf of two doctors charged with murder after
acceding to family's request for withdrawal of life support from PVS patient); In re Rosebush,
491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. App. 1990) (county prosecutor interceded to enjoin removal of life
support from 13-year-old PVS patient, citing potential criminal liability).
29. In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d
716 (Ga. 1984); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me.
1990). In each of these cases, physicians agreed with parents that life support systems should
be withdrawn, but legal uncertainties impelled the parties to seek a court order.
30. In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989). Illinois has since passed a surrogate
decision-making statute which specifically applies to minors as well as adults; ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110 1/2, para. 851 (Supp. 1992). A health facility in Missouri would surely require a
court's permission for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for a minor in a persistent
vegetative state; indeed, it is highly questionable whether court approval would be
forthcoming. See In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991),
[VOL. 35
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The situation of minor children in a persistent vegetative state is particu-
larly worthy of attention. The inherently wrenching nature of their circumstances
calls for public policy aimed at easing the families' burdens to the greatest extent
possible; yet, unlike formerly competent adults, these patients have never had the
capacity to voice their preferences. This fact makes it particularly problematic to
apply the "substituted judgment" doctrine3 espoused by most courts in cases
concerning patients whose general life views, if not actual preferences, were once
known. Furthermore, minority status precludes the possibility of meeting the
Missouri requirement of clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wislies
expressed while competent, a standard validated by the Supreme Court in
Cruzan. In Missouri, this "Catch-22" permitted the tragic Saga of Christine
Busalacchi, whose case appeared to be truly unresolvable. Injured in an automo-
bile accident at age seventeen, Christine lay for years in an apparent persistent
vegetative state in the same institution where Nancy Cruzan was hospitalized. 32
Peter Busalacchi, Christine's father and legal guardian, was unsuccessful in his
attempt to remove her to Minnesota for further evaluation and possible with-
drawal of care if a diagnosis of persistent vegetative state were to be confirmed.33
appeal dismissed, 1993 WL 32356 (Mo. Jan. 26, 1993). In its opinion, the Missouri Court of
Appeals noted that, given the passage of Christine Busalacchi's eighteenth birthday after her
incapacitation, her father's request to transfer his daughter out of state must be evaluated from
the standpoint of his role as her guardian, not as her natural father, but "the obligations of a
guardian and of a natural parent are not incongruous; both are guided by what is in the best
interests of the ward or of the child." Busalacchi, 1991 WL 26851 at *3. The court denied
Peter Busalacchi's petition, largely, it appears, because it perceived that he was attempting to
evade Missouri's stringent laws by transferring his daughter to a health care facility in
Minnesota, where a confirmed PVS diagnosis would permit him to withdraw life support
systems. Id at *6. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. See also Cruzan v. Harmon,
760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (construing Missouri's guardianship statute to place an
"affirmative duty on guardians to assure that the ward receives medical care" but finding "no
statutory basis for the argument that the guardian possesses authority, as a guardian, to order
the termination of medical treatment").
31. The "substituted judgment" standard was first enunciated on behalf of a PVS
patient in the landmark case of In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976): "If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative existence
to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of her right of privacy, as we
believe it to be, then it should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition prevents
her conscious exercise of the choice. The only practical way to prevent destruction of the right
is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment ... as to whether
she would exercise it in these circumstances." Numerous cases have since relied on this kind
of analysis. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 425 So. 2d 921 (Fla.
1984); Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d
738 (Wash. 1983). Some surrogate decision-making statutes also set forth standards relating to
the patient's wishes, if known, or system of values, if known. See infra note 145. See also infra
notes 45-83 and accompanying text (discussing substituted judgment doctrine).
32. See Nancy Gibbs, Love and Let Die, TIME, Mar. 19, 1990, at 62. This story,
featuring a photograph of Pete Busalacchi and Christine on the cover, describes the situations
of both Nancy Cruzan and Christine Busalacchi, as well as others; it appeared before the
Cruzan decision was handed down.
33. In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991), appeal
dismissed, 1993 WL 32356 (Mo. Jan. 26, 1993). The Court of Appeals remanded Christine's
case to the Probate Court for further evidentiary hearings regarding her condition and
prognosis. Id at *6. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the decision. High Court
Orders Assessment of Busalacchi, ST. LouIs POST DISPATCH, Oct. 17, 1991, at 4A. In
November 1991, Probate Judge Louis Kohn again ruled in favor of Mr. Busalacchi's right to
move Christine to Minnesota. Theresa Tighe, Judge Rules for Busalacchi, ST. Louis POST
DISPATCH, Nov. 30, 1991, at IA. The Missouri Supreme Court recently dismissed the case,
with no opinion on the merits, at the request of the newly-elected State Attorney General.
Terry Ganey, Court Dismisses Busalacchi Case, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 1993, at
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The Missouri appellate court's decision suggested that because of Christine's
minority at the time of the accident, her case would never be able to meet the
Cruzan standard required for termination of medical treatment in Missouri.34
This Article takes the position that, absent extraordinary circumstances
such as incapacity, conflict of interest, or disagreement between parents, the par-
ents of a minor child with an established diagnosis of persistent vegetative state
should have the right to decide whether to terminate medical treatment, including
nutrition and hydration. Resort to court intervention should be unnecessary, so
long as another disinterested examining physician confirms the treating physi-
cian's diagnosis and prognosis of no reasonable hope of return to consciousness.
Consultation with an advisory group, such as a hospital ethics committee, may be
useful to the parents if they desire it, but should in no way be required or incor-
porated into the formal channels of a decision-making process.
The right of parental decision-making on behalf of children, including
medical decision-making, is well grounded in both common law35 and constitu-
tional jurisprudence. 36 While the state has both power and responsibility under
the concept of parens patriae to act for the best interests of all children,37 this
doctrine justifies intervention on behalf of minors only when their parents are
guilty of abuse or neglect,38 or when they cannot agree about a vital matter per-
taining to the child's welfare, such as in the situation of custody disputes. 39
Because withdrawal of treatment is a medically reasonable choice for a PVS
patient, no such justification for state intrusion exists when parents make that
1A. More than five years after her accident, Christine finally died at Barnes Hospital in St.
Louis, where her feeding tube was withdrawn shortly after the dismissal. Theresa Tighe,
Christine Dies at 22; Father Says "Nobody Won" As Life, Legal Struggle End, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 1993, at 1A. See also Theresa Tighe, Busalacchi's Death Offers Few
Answers; Missouri Law Remains Silent on Some Life Support Choices, ST. LoUIs POST-
DISPATCH, Mar. 9, 1993, at 1A.
34. In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851 at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991),
appeal dismissed, 1993 WL 32356 (Mo. Jan. 26, 1993).
35. See generally MEISEL, supra note 23, § 13; JAMES M. MORRISSEY ET AL.,
CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS:
A LEGAL GUIDE 1-2 (1986); Angela R. Holder, Special Categories of Consent: Minors and
Handicapped Newborns, in 3 TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW (Michael G. MacDonald et al.
eds., 1991) § 19.01, at 19-4, 19-5 (noting, inter alia, that at common law, medical treatment
of a child without the father's permission made the physician liable to the father for assault and
battery, as it constituted an interference with his right to control the child; id at 19-5); Karen
H. Rothenberg, Medical Decision Making for Children, in I BIOLAW: A LEGAL AND ETHICAL
REPORTER ON MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE, AND BIOENGINEERING § 8-2.1 (James F. Childress
et al. eds., 1989).
36. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (right to commit child to state mental
institution, so long as review procedures were in place); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (right to withdraw children from school after eighth grade, based on religious values);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to send children to private or
religiously affiliated school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to employ foreign
language teacher for children). For further discussion, see infra notes 95-103 and
accompanying text.
37. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES § 9.3, at 335 (2d ed. 1988) (using the term "parens patriae" to refer to "the
power of the state to intercede for the protection of the child's health, safety or welfare").
38. See id. § 9.3, at 336, and cases cited therein (when a state seeks to use its parens
patriae power to order medical treatment for a child whose parents have refused consent, the
common procedure is a court declaration that the child is dependent or neglected, followed by
appointment of a temporary guardian invested with authority to consent to the medical care).
39. See generally id § 19.1
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decision on behalf of their minor child. Furthermore, the same rationale should
apply whenever the event responsible for the child's persistent vegetative state
occurs during minority, even if the actual diagnosis or decision-making opportu-
nity does not arise until after the patient has attained the age of eighteen. Because
the law in this respect is so unclear, and because courts are ill equipped in any
given case to provide guidelines covering all potential future cases within their
jurisdictions, state legislatures should provide clear surrogate/family decision-
making statutes which will include minors and which will insulate from civil or
criminal liability health care providers who in good faith act on the decision-
makers' directions, provided that the original diagnosis and prognosis were
determined in accordance with accepted standards of medical care.
B. Why Are Minors Different?
Obviously, all persons in a persistent vegetative state are incompetent;
therefore someone else must make any relevant decisions concerning their medi-
cal care. Beginning in 1976 with the seminal case of In re Quinlan,40 courts
began to recognize the validity of the concept that appropriate medical care for a
person in a persistent vegetative state could entail a decision to withhold or to
withdraw certain life-sustaining measures which could properly be characterized
as prolonging the dying process rather than providing any possible hope for the
patient's improvement. In the same year that Quinlan was decided, California
passed the nation's first Natural Death Act. 41 Thus the stage Was set for the
national debate over the appropriate parameters and mechanisms for defining and
effectuating an individual's "right to die" 42 Since then, in addition to voluminous
legislative enactments, 43 there have been more than sixty reported court decisions
concerning the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. 4 An
analysis of their bases clarifies why the situation of minors in a persistent vege-
tative state presents special problems.
In the first case of its kind, In re Quinlan,45 the New Jersey Supreme Court
concluded that Karen Ann Quinlan had a right, grounded in the right of privacy
protected by the federal constitution, 46 to refuse unwanted medical care. This
right encompassed a right to decide to withdraw the respirator which doctors had
testified was keeping Karen alive.47 The court entertained "no doubt ... that if
Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval ... and perceptive of her
irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of the
life-support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural death,"48 and ruled
that Karen should not lose her right simply by virtue of her incompetency. 49 It
followed that the only practical manner in which her right could be exercised was
by a guardian who would be sufficiently familiar with her views to exercise
40. 355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
41. REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at Intro.-l.
42. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
43. See generally REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 4.
44. See RIGHT-TO-DIE COURT DECISIONS, supra note 3; Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408, 412-13 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (54 cases reported between 1976 and 1988 are collected
by state).
45. 355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
46. Id. at 662-63.
47. Id. at 663-64.
48. Id. at 663.
49. Id.
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"substituted judgment ' 50 on her behalf.51 Karen's father, Joseph Quinlan, was
found to be an appropriate guardian to perform this function. 52
It is important to note that the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically
rejected Mr. Quinlan's arguments based on his parental relationship with Karen,
stating that "Insofar as a parental right of privacy has been recognized, it has
been in the context of determining the rearing of infants and ... involved
'continuing life styles."' 53 Karen was a twenty-two-year-old adult at the time of
the decision.54 It is true that the court mentioned that Karen's family should be
included in the guardian's decision-making process,55 and that we do not know
how the court might have treated Mr. Quinlan's claims to decision-making power
based on his parental relationship if Karen had been a minor. However, the court
insisted upon keeping its decision grounded firmly in "substituted judgment"
concepts by noting that the decision to withdraw life support would not involve
"the unlawful taking of the life of another," inasmuch as it would be "a matter of
[Karen's] self-determination. '56 If self-determination is the necessary key to
valid refusal-of-treatment decisions, a minor, definitionally never competent by
reason of age, is in danger of legal limbo where such decisions are concerned.
The question of making a refusal-of-treatment decision for a never-compe-
tent person arose a year after Quinlan in Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz.57 In analyzing whether to follow the advice of a guardian to
forego painful chemotherapy for a profoundly retarded sixty-seven-year-old man
with leukemia, the Massachusetts Supreme Court agreed with its New Jersey
counterpart that individuals do have a right to refuse medical treatment,58 includ-
ing, in appropriate circumstances, potentially life-prolonging treatment. 59
Furthermore, "[tihe recognition of that right must extend to the case of an
50. Id- at 666 (referring to "the doctrine of 'substituted judgment' by name; see supra
note 31 for the court's definition of that concept).
51. Id. at 664.
52. Id. at 670-71.
53. Id. at 664 (citing and quoting the trial judge's reasoning, 348 A.2d 801, 822 (NJ.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1975)). An additional reason why the trial court found the parental right to
privacy argument lacking is based upon the fact that the right to privacy is never an absolute
power, whether exercised by or on behalf of an individual. 348 A.2d at 822. Therefore, to
uphold the parental right to refuse medical treatment on behalf of a child would be to
undermine the "doctor's duty to provide life-giving care." Id In sum, the trial court held that
"[t]here is no constitutional right to die that can be asserted by a parent for his incompetent
adult child." Id
54. 355 A.2d at 664.
55. Id. at 664, 671.
56. Id. at 670.
57. 370 NE.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
58. The Massachusetts court grounded the right in both common law concepts of the
right to be "free from nonconsensual invasion of ... bodily integrity," id at 424, which gave
rise to the doctrine of informed consent, and in the "constitutional right of privacy found in the
penumbra of specific guaranties of the Bill of Rights." Id.
59. The court identified four potentially countervailing state interests which might
outweigh a person's right to refuse medical treatment: "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the
protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4)
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession." Id at 425. The preservation of
human life was identified as the most significant interest implicated in the case, but the court
found that in the situation of an incurable illness, where "the issue is not whether but when, for
how long, and at what cost to the individual that life may be briefly extended .... The value of
life ... is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent




incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because the value of human dignity
extends to both."60 The court also agreed that the "substituted judgment" stan-
dard delineated in 'Quinlan "[c]ommends itself simply because of its straightfor-
ward respect for the integrity and autonomy of the individual." 6' The
Massachusetts court echoed Quinlan's reference to a hypothetical "lucid inter-
val"62 when it characterized the decision as "that which would be made by the
incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into account the
present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which
would necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the competent per-
son."63
There is a clear analogy between minors and never-competent adults. The
age of majority is generally eighteen;64 it is also usually the requisite for execut-
ing a valid advance directive.A6 It may additionally be perceived as the necessary
age for voicing preferences of sufficient probative value to meet the Cruzan
standard.6 6 The question arises whether the Quinlan/Saikewicz "lucid interval"
analysis, which posits first that incompetent persons must be accorded the same
60. Id. at 427.61. Id. at 431.
62. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
63. 370 NE.2d at 431.
64. See CLARK, supra note 37, § 8.1, at 309 (noting that most states have amended age
of majority statutes to include persons age 18 and older). But see ALA. CODE § 26-1-1 (1986'
& Supp. 1990) (age of majority reduced from 21 to 19); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 1-3-21, -27
(1972) (age of majority remains 21); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2101 (1988) (same); 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1991 (Purdon Supp. 1991) (same); WYO. STAT. § 8-1-102 (1989) (age of
majority reduced to 19).
65. But see ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(a) (1990) and supra note 64 (restricting
applicability of act to adult persons, which in Alabama means age 19 or older); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-4503(2) (1985 & Supp. 1991) (including emancipated minors within provisions of
advance directive statute); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703(a) (Supp. 1992) (same);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(a)(1), (d) (1990 & Supp. 1991) (stating only that person be of
sound mind and making no specific references to age requirement); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 3102(5) (West Supp. 1991) (requiring that persons issuing advance directives be 21 years or
older, although age of majority in Oklahoma is 18); WYO. STAT. § 35-22-102(a) (Supp. 1991)
and supra note 64 (authorizing adult persons to issue advance directives, which under
Wyoming law means age 19 or older). Note that although Maryland incorporates no specific
age requirement or "adult person" language in its advance directive statute, the restriction of
applicability to "any individual qualified to make a will," results in an age limitation of 18. See
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §5-602 (1990) and MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-
101 (1991).
66. But see In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (IlL. 1989) (17-year-old girl with leukemia who
refused blood transfusions on religious grounds was found to be sufficiently mature to exercise
her right to refuse medical treatment; the decision was based on bath her common law right
and her constitutional rights); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990) (oral statements by PVS
patient made at age 17 held to be sufficiently mature and deliberative to govern treatment
withdrawal decision). Given the attitudes evinced by the Missouri courts, however, it is highly
doubtful that desires expressed before age 18 regarding the termination of life support would
ever be honored in that state. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419-20 (Mo. 1988)
(citing the state's strong interest in the sanctity of life, which "rests on the principle that life is
precious and worthy of preservation without regard to its quality" and linking the state's policy
"strongly favoring life" with Missouri's particularly restrictive "Living Will" statute, Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 459.010 (Vernon Supp. 1991), under which a declarant must be at least 18 years
old, and nutrition and hydration are specifically excluded from procedures that may be
withdrawn; In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991), appeal
dismissed, 1993 WL 32356 (Mo. Jan. 26, 1993). Cf In re Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr.,
557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1990) (summarily dismissing 17-year-old
Jehovah's Witness's attempt to refuse blood transfusion).
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rights as competent individuals and secondly that "substituted judgment" is the
only appropriate standard, is actually a sound approach for decision-making on
behalf of a never-competent person, particularly a minor.
The first supposition-that incompetent persons are entitled to the same
rights as competent persons-has been almost universally accepted by state
courts. In 1983, the Washington Supreme Court crisply stated, "[ain incompe-
tent's right to refuse treatment should be equal to a competent's right to do so.
No court has denied an individual the right because of incompetency to exercise
it."67 This tenet has also been relied upon in refusal-of-treatment cases dealing
specifically with minors. In 1982, the Massachusetts Supreme Court applied its
Saikewicz rationale to approve a "do-not-resuscitate" order for an abandoned
infant who had become a ward of the state.68 That same year, the Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld on grounds of "the child's independent right" the validity
of a state statute permitting parents and physicians to discontinue life support
systems for a permanently comatose child.69 In In re Barry,70 where parents
sought to discontinue life support for their ten-month-old son who was in a per-
sistent vegetative state, a Florida court reasoned that "the constitutional right of
privacy would be an empty right if one who is incompetent were not granted the
right of a competent counterpart to exercise his rights." 71 Again, in In re LH.R.,72
also dealing with an infant in a chronic vegetative state, the Georgia Supreme
Court, citing Barry extensively, held that the right to refuse medical treatment in
the absence of a conflicting state interest "rises to the level of a constitutional
right which is not lost because of the incompetence or youth of the patient." 73
In the eyes of the Missouri Supreme Court, however, the right of an
incompetent person to refuse life-sustaining treatment-whether rooted in com-
mon law principles74 or in a constitutional right of privacy75-could not be exer-
cised by a third party "absent the most rigid of formalities."76 The court based its
conclusion in part on the basic prerequisites of informed consent:
the patient must have the capacity to reason and make judgments, the
decision must be made voluntarily and without coercion, and the patient
67. In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 744 (Wash. 1983). A year later, the same court applied
this concept to a never-competent adult. In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984).
68. Custody of a Minor, 434 N.E.2d 601 (Mass. 1982). The court reiterated its
preference for the "substituted judgment" doctrine over the alternative "best interests of the
child" test, noting, however, that in the case of a young child, the two standards involve
basically the same reasoning. Ia at 608-09 n.10.
69. In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (La. 1982). The court implied that it would
reach the same result even absent the statute when it cited another court's conclusion that "the
right of a terminally ill and comatose person to refuse extraordinary means for prolonging life
should be accorded equally to competent and incompetent persons, so that the judiciary (in the
absence of legislation) must provide the incompetent person with a method by which that right
might be exercised." Ld. (citing Eichner v. Dillon, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981)).
70. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
71. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). The reasoning of Barry was specifically
cited with approval by the Florida Supreme Court in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
72. 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984).
73. Id. at 722.
74. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,416-17 (Mo. 1988).
75. Id. at 417-18.
76. Id. at 425. The court's meaning is clarified by its reference to "the formalities
required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing, inherently reliable
evidence absent here." Id
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must have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of the proposed
treatment alternatives or nontreatment, along with a full understanding of
the nature of the disease and the prognosis. 7
In light of these criteria, reasoned the court, "it is definitionally impossible for a
person to make an informed decision-either to consent or to refuse-under
hypothetical circumstances .... "78 The court also quoted renowned constitutional
law commentator Laurence Tribe: 'Given the fact that these patients are irre-
versibly comatose or in a chronic vegetative state, attributing "rights" to these
patients at all is somewhat problematic .... 79
The United States Supreme Court was even more overtly troubled by the
assertion that an incompetent person should possess the same rights as a compe-
tent one. The opinion states:
The difficulty with petitioners' claim is that in a sense it begs the ques-
tion: an incompetent person is not able to make an informed and volun-
tary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any
other right. Such a "right" must be exercised for her, if at all, by some
sort of surrogate. Here, Missouri has in effect recognized that under cer-
tain circumstances a surrogate may act for the patient in electing to have
hydration and nutrition withdrawn in such a way as to cause death, but it
has established a procedural safeguard to assure that the action of the
surrogate conforms as best it may to the wishes expressed by the patient
while competent. Missouri requires that evidence of the incompetent's
wishes as to the withdrawal of treatment be proved by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. 80
In light of the importance of the state's asserted interest in the "protection and
preservation of human life," 8' the Court approved Missouri's standard, which
eschews the "lucid interval" analysis of Quinlan and Saikewicz in favor of
requirements that the patient (1) must have made prior statements of sufficient
probative value concerning her preferences in such a situation; and (2) must have
been competent (i.e., an adult not suffering from a disqualifying mental incapac-
ity) at the time the statements were made.
Even though New York and Missouri are the only two states whose courts
have insisted upon such a rigid standard, 82 there is obvious logic to the position
that, absent an advance directive or clearly expressed preferences, it is difficult at
best to "don the mental mantle'' 83 of an incompetent person for purposes of mak-
ing a "substituted judgment" about whether to forego life-sustaining treatment.
The fiction of the "lucid interval" might make sense as applied to patients who
have been competent adults and whose general life views and values are known
to accessible, concerned people, such as close family members. However, it is
totally without foundation, and thus analytically unsatisfactory, in situations
77. Id at 417 (citing Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward
Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 955,957 (1984)).
78. 760 S.W.2d at 417.
79. Id. at 425 (quoting LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1368
n.25 (1975)).
80. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,280 (1990).
81. Id.
82. In addition to Cruzan, see In re Westchester County Medical Ctr. (O'Connor), 531
N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988) and In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
83. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431
(Mass. 1977) (quoting In re Carson, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288,289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)).
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where patients have never been competent, due either to mental incapacity or to
minority. Furthermore, given the Supreme Court's validation of the
Missouri/New York perspective, the failure to develop a different approach will
continue to leave some cases virtually insulated from any decision-making pro-
cess.
At least where minors are concerned, however, this intolerable state of
affairs is resolvable in a manner that will protect both the rights of the minor
patients and the legitimate needs of their grieving families. The solution lies at
hand in tools of jurisprudence that are already well established and familiar.
II. THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS TO MAKE DECISIONS ON BEHALF
OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN
A. Sources and Scope of the Right
The rights of parents to make decisions concerning the welfare and up-
bringing of their children have roots in both common law and constitutional
doctrine.84 Historically, the common law regarded children as the property of
their parents, with few, if any, rights of their own.85 As the natural guardians of
their children, liable for their maintenance and care, parents have the power to
consent to medical treatment for their children, who are generally considered too
immature to consent for themselves.86 In the traditional view, a physician who, in
the absence of an emergency, treats a child or performs surgery without the
informed consent of the child's parent or legal guardian is liable for the tort of
battery.87 Exceptions may exist for emancipated minors88 or under the "mature
minor" rule recognized by some jurisdictions.89 In addition, constitutionally pro-
tected privacy rights extend some medical decision-making powers to minors, 90
and most states have statutes permitting minors to consent to certain forms
of medical care. 91 By and large, however, the requisite "informed
84. ,See supra notes 35-36.
85. See Holder, supra note 35, § 19.01 [1]; Rothenberg, supra note 35, § 8-2.1.
86. MEISEL, supra note 23, § 13.2; Rothenberg, supra note 35, § 8-2.1.
87. CLARK, supra note 37, § 9.3, at 335 (physician's liability to child in tort); Holder,
supra note 35, § 19.01[2] (tort liability to father); Rothenberg, supra note 35, § 8-2.1.
88. See generally CLARK, supra note 37, § 8.3; MEISEL, supra note 23, § 13.3;
MORRISSEY Er AL., supra note 35, at 32-35; Holder, supra note 35, § 19.03[3]; Rothenberg,
supra note 35, § 8-4.2. Some advance directive statutes include emancipated minors among
those qualified to execute such documents. IDAHO CODE § 39-4503(2) (1985 & Supp. 1991);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-10 (Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-2(2)
(Bums 1990 & Supp. 1992). See also supra note 65.
89. See CLARK, supra note 37, § 8.1, at 311 (noting "a body of case law which holds
that if the minor is mature enough to understand the proposed medical or surgical procedure,
he may give binding consent to it, perhaps with the additional qualification that the procedure
is not one involving serious risk to life or health"). See also id. § 9.3, at 335; MEISEL, supra
note 23, § 13.3; MORRISSEY Er AL., supra note 35, at 43-48; Holder, supra note 35,
§ 19.01[4]; Rothenberg, supra note 35, § 8-4.1.
90. These include rights to make decisions about procreation, birth control, and
abortion. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (abortion); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraception); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(abortion). See generally MORRISSEY Er AL., supra note 35, at 63-70; Holder, supra note 35,
§§ 19.06[3]-[4]; Rothenberg, supra note 35, § 8-2.2.
91. Public policy has been particularly supportive of statutes permitting minors to
consent on a confidential basis to treatment for sexually transmitted diseases and for substance
abuse problems. MORRISSEY Er AL., supra note 35, at 74-78; Holder, supra note 35,
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consent ' 92 to nonemergency medical care for children still equates to parental
permission.93
In addition to parental prerogatives recognized by the common law, consti-
tutionally protected privacy rights vest in parents' broad rights to make basic
decisions concerning the welfare, upbringing, and education of their children.94
In Parham v. ZR.,95 a decision upholding a statute that permitted parents to
commit their minor children to state mental hospitals under voluntary commit-"
ment procedures, the Supreme Court delineated the foundation for its views:
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts
of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.
Our cases have consistently followed that course; our constitutional sys-
tem long ago rejected any notion that a child is "the mere creature of the
State" and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally "have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their chil-
dren] [sic] for additional obligations." ... Surely, this includes a "high
duty" to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical
advice. The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that par-
ents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important,
historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents
to act in the best interests of their children. 96
Constitutional rights of the minor patients themselves were implicated in
the case, as the Court acknowledged: "[A] child, in common with adults, has a
substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treat-
ment ...."97 Nonetheless, based on its presumption that parents will act in the best
interests of their children, the Court held that, absent abuse or neglect, parents
had the right to make the commitment decision on behalf of their minor children,
so long as the decision was sustainable on medical grounds.98 In this connection,
the Court noted that Georgia's requirement of independent diagnostic verifica-
tion by a physician better served a child's due process rights than would adver-
sarial proceedings in a courtroom, for "neither judges nor administrative hearing
officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psychiatric judgments." 99
§ 19.01[3]. Many states have also enacted more general medical consent statutes for minors,
frequently designating age of consent at 16. Id § 19.01[3][c]; Rothenberg, supra note 35, § 8-
4.3.
92. For a general discussion of informed consent and its relationship to minors and
their parents, see MORRISSEY Er AL., supra note 35, at 12-17.
93. But see Holder, supra note 35, § 19.01[4] (noting that "there are no reported cases
within the past 30 years in the United States in which a parent has recovered damages from a
physician for appropriate treatment for which consent had been given not by the parent but by
the minor patient who was over the age of 15").
94. See supra note 36 and cases cited therein.
95. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
96. Id. at 602 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)) (other
citations omitted). In his concurrence, Justice Stewart observed, "for centuries it has been a
canon of the common law that parents speak for their minor children. So deeply imbedded in
our traditions is this principle of law that the Constitution itself may compel a State to respect
it." 442 U.S. at 621 (citations omitted).
97. 442 U.S. at 600.
98. Id. at 602.
99. Id. at 607 (quoting In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1299 (Cal. 1977) (Clark, J.,
dissenting)). The Parham Court's opinion also stated: "common human experience and
scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to
1993] 187
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
It is true that the constitutionally protected right of parents to make deci-
sions concerning the welfare of their children is not unlimited and may well be
subject to greater restriction in the field of medical decision-making than in any
other area.100 The state's parens patriae power permits it not only to enforce
broad regulations for the health, welfare, and safety of children, such as compul-
sory education laws, 10' but also to sustain requirements for specific medical pro-
cedures, such as universal immunization, even over parental objections based on
religious grounds. 02 In individual cases, a court may order medical treatment to
which parents have refused consent, and a finding of abuse or neglect, including
failure to obtain appropriate medical care for a child, will invariably justify state
intervention. 03 Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Parham v. J.R. took account of
these premises, and nonetheless found that, unless the individual case presented
an instance of abuse or of medically unsound judgment, parental decision-making
was to be respected. The reasoning of this case applies as well to other areas of
medical decision-making for minors, including the decision to withhold or
withdraw treatment from a minor child in a persistent vegetative state: so long as
the decision is based upon a confirmed medical diagnosis and there is neither
conflict between parents nor any basis upon which to disqualify them as compe-
tent decision-makers, they should have the sole right to make the termination-of-
treatment decision, without judicial intervention.
B. When Should Parents Be Disqualified?
While parents have broad rights to make decisions on behalf of their minor
children, including medical decisions, these rights are not absolute, and under
certain circumstances, they may be lost altogether.104 Several criteria appear to be
essential for parents to make a responsible decision to forego life-sustaining
treatment for a child in a persistent vegetative state: the parents must be compe-
tent to make the decision and must be fully apprised of the information necessary
to give their informed consent to the decision; there must not be a disqualifying
conflict of interest between the parents and their child; there must be no basis
upon which a reasonable person could characterize the parents as guilty of abuse
or neglect with respect to their child; and, if the decision is to be effectuated
determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and treatment of
mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real." 442 U.S. at 609. This
article suggests that the same observation holds true for medical decisions concerning the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for minors in a persistent vegetative
state.
100. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 37, § 9.3, at 335 ("Broad state intervention in
children's health occurs pursuant to statutes which require immunization against certain
diseases, medical examinations for children entering the public schools, and certain treatments
for newborn children"). See generally Holder, supra note 35, § 19.05; Rothenberg, supra note
35, §§ 8-2.3, 8-2.4.
101. CLARK, supra note 37, § 9.2.
102. Id. § 9.3, at 335-36.
103. See generally id § 9.3, at 336-38, and cases cited therein; MEISEL, supra note 23,
§ 13.5, at 418-19, and cases cited therein; MORRISSEY Er AL., supra note 35, at 94-101;
Holder, supra note 35, § 19.05 and cases cited therein; John C. Williams, Annotation, Power
of Court or Other Public Agency to Order Medical Treatment for Child over Parental
Objections Not Based on Religious Grounds, 97 A.L.R.3d 421 (1980); Kenneth J. Rampino,
Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public Agency to Order Medical Treatment over
Parental Religious Objections for Child Whose Life Is Not Immediately Endangered, 52
A.L.R.3d 1118 (1973).
104. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
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without judicial supervision, there should be no conflict or difference of opinion
on the issue between the two parents.105 Finally, if the child is an older minor of
demonstrable maturity and has expressed views about how she would want to be
treated,106 the question arises whether that expression should be sufficient to
override a contrary parental decision.
1. Competence
Valid medical decision-making is in every instance predicated upon
informed consent. 107 The necessity that informed consent be given prior to the
105. These or similar factors have been generally referenced in cases concerning
withdrawal of treatment for minors. See In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (parents were "adequately informed," had consulted religious advisors, were "not
motivated by any financial strain" and judgment was "backed by uncontroverted medical
evidence"). Cf. In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (Ga. 1984) ("In a case of suspected
neglect or abuse or when the parent assumes a stance which in any way endangers the child,
the parent's right to speak for the child may be lost .... [C]ourts remain available in the event
of disagreement between the parties, any case of suspected abuse, or other appropriate
instances"); In re Doe, No. D-93064, slip op. at 14 (Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton County Oct. 17,
1991) ("[A]ny interference in family privacy by state action must be viewed as a drastic
remedy which should be resorted to only in extreme cases where a child has been grossly
neglected or abandoned, where there is a substantial risk that the child will imminently suffer
serious moral harm or serious mental, emotional, sexual, physical abuse, harm or cruelty from
the parents, or when the court otherwise finds a parent unfit or that the conduct or condition of
a parent is such as to render that parent unable to properly care for the child, or if there is
serious conflict of interest") (citing In re L.H.R., Georgia statutes on termination of parental
rights, and In re Baby Doe), affd, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992) (court involvement necessary
because of parental disagreement);. In re Doe, No. D-62058, slip op. at 5 (Ga. Super. Ct.
Fulton County Nov. 30, 1988) [hereinafter cited as In re Baby Doe to prevent confusion with
In re Doe from the same court] (pursuant to the ruling in In re LH.R., father suspected of
abuse lost right to speak for child; the court and the mother must decide, id. at 9); In re
Rosebush, No. 88 349180 AZ, slip op. at 7-8 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Oakland County July 29, 1988)
(noting the thoroughness of the parents' decision-making process, including consultation with
physicians, a hospital ethics committee, and spiritual advisors for over 15 months to arrive at a
decision that "was not reached hastily or arbitrarily" and "was made in good faith").
Commentators have also emphasized the importance of these factors as prerequisites to
parental decision-making. See ANGELA RODDEY HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND
ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 118-19 (2d ed. 1985) (requiring correct diagnosis, prognosis, and
absence of abuse); MEISEL, supra note 23, § 13.10, at 425 (citing In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) and In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984)); Lantos et al., supra
note 25, at 311, 313 (requiring parental agreement).
106. This was the situation in In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (11. 1989), reh'g denied,
(1990) (17-year-old Jehovah's Witness wished to refuse blood transfusion; her mother
acquiesced in her decision) and In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990) (PVS patient injured in
auto accident at age 17 had previously stated desire not to be maintained in such a condition).
In each case, the court based its decision on the minor's expressed wishes. See also John E.
Schowalter et al., The Adolescent Patient's Decision to Die, 51 PEDIATRICS 97 (Jan. 1973)
(relating story of handling at Yale-New Haven Hospital of 16-year-old conscious renal
patient's decision to halt treatment, in which her parents acquiesced; after psychiatric work
with the patient and her family, the medical staff overcame its initial reluctance and supported
the choice).
107. This common law doctrine is frequently traced to a famous statement by Justice
Cardozo, while sitting on the Court of Appeals of New York: "Every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages." Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914). See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,269 (1990). See generally
TOM L. BEAUcHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 74-111,
78 (3d ed. 1989), (discussing the "elements of informed consent" as "1. Disclosure; 2.
Understanding; 3. Voluntariness; 4. Competence; 5. Consent."); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR
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administration of medical care (absent emergency) is frequently characterized as
the basis for the validity of refusal-of-treatment decisions as well. 108 Except in
special situations, parents must give their informed consent to medical treatment
of their children.109 As pointed out by the Missouri Supreme Court in its Cruzan
opinion, informed consent requires, at a minimum, (1) "the capacity to reason
and make judgments"; (2) "the decision must be made voluntarily and without
coercion"; (3) "a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of the proposed
treatment alternatives or [the alternative of] nontreatment"; and (4) "a full
understanding of the nature of the disease and the prognosis." 10
Thus, in order to make a valid refusal-of-treatment decision for a minor
child in a persistent vegetative state, parents must be competent, both in the sense
of having the requisite mental capacity"' and in the sense of having the appro-
priate information upon which to base their decision. Providing the information
is the task of the involved medical personnel, primarily the treating physician." 2
As in other situations, mental capacity can normally be presumed." 3 If involved
medical personnel doubt capacity in any given instance of parental decision-
making, this would justify resort to judicial intervention." 4
THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, I MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, 1-111 (1982) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS] ("Informed consent is rooted in the fundamental recognition-reflected in the
legal presumption of competency-that adults are entitled to accept or reject health care
interventions on the basis of their own personal values and in furtherance of their own personal
goals." Id. at 2-3); ARNOLD J. ROSOFF, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS (1981).
108. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 ("The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed
consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse
treatment"); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (NJ. 1985) ("The patient's ability to control
his bodily integrity through informed consent is significant only when one recognizes that this
right also encompasses a right to informed refusal"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (NJ.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See generally THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE
TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING (1987)
[hereinafter THE HASTINGS CENTER]; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 43-90 (1983) [hereinafter DECIDING TO FOREGO].
109. See supra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
110. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988) (quoting Wanzer et al., supra
note 77). See also supra note 107 and sources cited therein.
111. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILRESS, supra note 107, at 79-85. See also id., at 99-106
(discussing "understanding"); DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at 45; HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS, supra note 107, at 55-62, 57 (discussing as "elements of capacity" "(1) possession
of a set of values and goals; (2) the ability to communicate and to understand information; and
(3) the ability to reason and to deliberate about one's choices").
112. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 107, at 85-99; THE HASTINGS
CENTER, supra note 108, at 20-22; DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at 51-60; HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS, supra note 107, at 70-111; Norman L. Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the
Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243,255 (1977). See also In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (NJ. 1885) ("In general, it is the doctor's role to provide the
necessary medical facts and the patient's role to make the subjective treatment decision based
on his understanding of those facts").
113. All the cases dealing with parental decision-making for minors in a persistent
vegetative state seem to rely on this assumption, as they contain no separate discussion of the
issue. See cases cited supra notes 29 and 105. Advance directive statutes frequently specify
that a health care provider may assume competence of the declarant. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(B) (1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2426(b) (1991); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16--11-15 (Bums 1990 & Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(2) (1990).
114. For example, some of the health care professionals involved in the care of Sammy
Linares later expressed doubt about the capacity of the Linares family, particularly Rudy
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2. Conflict of Interest
In holding that the parents of a ten-month-old child in a chronic vegetative
state could order discontinuation of life support, and further that parents similarly
situated need not obtain judicial permission to make such a decision, a Florida
District Court of Appeal took note of the physicians' testimony that the parents'
decision "was not motivated by any financial strain because one hundred percent
of all the medical expenses were being covered by their insurance."11 5 Other
courts ruling in favor of the rights of surrogates to make decisions for incompe-
tent patients have observed the inherent potential for conflict of interest.
116
Logically, the question would appear most likely to arise either in the event that
the patient's death would mean relief of a financial burden to the decision-maker
or in circumstances where the decision-maker might stand to benefit financially
upon the patient's death. Often, however, expenses are borne either by insurance
coverage or by the state itself.117 Furthermore, instances in which parents will
Linares, to have made a reasoned decision, if given the opportunity. Goldman et al., supra note
26, at 302-03 (citing Mr. Linares' alleged alcohol and drug abuse problems, along with
previous trouble with the police).
115. In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365,371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
116. See, e.g., In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 861 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, Drabick v.
Drabick, 488 U.S. 958 (1988) (requisite good faith "precludes a decision affected by a material
conflict of interest"); Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (Ct. App. 1983)
(noting lack of evidence of any motivation "other than love and concern for the dignity of their
husband and father"); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp.v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921,926-27
(Fla. 1984) ("[E]vidence of wrongful motives ... may require judicial intervention"); In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1218 (NJ. 1985) (noting that "[Tihere was no question that the
nephew had good intentions and had no real conflict of interest due to possible inheritance
.... "); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 747 (Wash. 1983) (pointing to general laws controlling
guardianships as safeguards against potential conflicts of interest). The Illinois surrogate
decision-making statute expressly provides that the surrogate "shall not be liable merely
because the surrogate may benefit from the act" or "has individual or conflicting interests in
relation to the care and affairs of the patient . ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-30(c)
(Supp. 1992). Cf. In re Steinhaus, (Minn. Redwood County Ct. Juv. Div. Sept. 11, 1986),
rev' d,(Redwood County Ct. Far. Div. Oct. 13, 1986). In Steinhaus, the Juvenile Division
judge, refusing to allow termination of treatment, stated in a memorandum following his
decision that ending treatment "would certainly have some benefits. ... The child's death
would ... put an end to the extensive medical care which must by this time amount to
tremendous expense." Id. slip op. at 17. This decision was reversed in the Family Division
when additional medical evidence proved the child to be in a persistent vegetative state.
117. In In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), the court noted that"one hundred percent of all the medical expenses were being covered by ... insurance." Nancy
Cruzan's expenses were borne entirely by the state of Missouri. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990). Christine Busalacchi was in the same state-run facility.
Gibbs, supra note 32. The fact that only one of the other cases pertaining to PVS minors even
mentions financial considerations (in an opinion later reversed, see In re Steinhaus, (Minn.
Redwood County Ct. Juv. Div. Sept. 11, 1986), rev'd, (Redwood County Ct. Fain. Div. Oct.
13, 1986)) suggests that the courts did not find them relevant, despite the obvious high costs
associated with such intensive care. See, e.g., In re Rosebush, No. 88 349180 AZ, slip op. at 4
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Oakland County July 29, 1988), appealfiled, No. 111082 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990) (PVS child injured in a car accident at age 12 "has had around-the-clock private duty
nurses; a team of rehabilitation therapists; and medical treatment and consultation" in failed
attempts at rehabilitative therapy. Even so, the parents' decision "was an agonizing one which
took some fifteen months to make." Id. at 8). But see Goldman et al., supra note 26, at 303,
citing the fact that the Linares family had received a letter from the Illinois Department of
Public Aid that medical benefits for Sammy's care would be cut off on April 30, 1989; Mr.
Linares forcibly removed Sammy from his ventilator on Apr. 26. Cf. Gibbs, supra note 32, at
70 (quoting the Rev. Harry Cole, whose wife fell into a coma after a severe stroke from which
she was not expected to recover. "If she were to go on that way, our family faced not only the
incredible pain of watching her vegetate, but we also faced harsh practical realities. [Given that
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actually benefit financially from the death of a minor child are likely to be
rare. 118 Even where surrogate decision-makers could expect to be beneficiaries of
an estate upon an incompetent patient's death, courts have not found that fact,
standing alone, necessarily disqualifying. 19 Where close family ties are involved,
emotional bonds can ordinarily be counted on to serve as the primary impelling
force in the decision-making process.120 Nonetheless, if involved medical per-
sonnel perceive that conflict of interest is playing an inappropriate role in the
parents' decision, they might well seek resort to judicial validation.
Of course, there can be noneconomic conflicts of interest. The emotional
burden on parents of coping with their unconscious child's condition, particularly
acute upon regular visits to the hospital (or the guilt incurred by staying away),
could clearly engender an attitude of seeking the relief of resolution. The toll on
other family members, and on family life in general, could exacerbate this
nursing home care would likely cost over $30,000 per year] [h]ow could I continue to send
three kids to college with the additional financial strain?" Cole sought to have his wife's
respirator removed; six days after ajudge stayed the decision, Jackie Cole woke up).
118. None of the cases concerning minors mentioned anticipated financial benefit upon
the minor's death. This kind of expectation has been noted, however, in cases concerning adult
patients. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1218 (N.J. 1985); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 747
(Wash. 1983).
119. Colyer, 660 P.2d at 747 (noting that "a guardian might act on the basis of less than
worthy motives, i.e., an interest in the incompetent's estate or a desire to alleviate the financial
burden of the life sustaining treatment," the court expressed faith in the safeguards provided in
guardianship laws. In a footnote, it said: "While we are aware that a family member who
petitions to be a guardian may be a beneficiary of the estate of the incompetent, this alone
should not disqualify the petitioner. In most instances, the familial relationship will strengthen,
and not undermine, the guardian's best judgment in exercising the personal rights of the
incompetent." Id n.40); cf. In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 861 n.38 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988) (where conservator was the beneficiary of a $40,000 life
insurance policy on his brother, the conservatee, the court stated, "While it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that this financial interest is logically relevant to the conservator's good faith, it
does not follow that this interest would compel the superior court to disapprove the petition or,
more appropriately, to appoint a new conservator. Conservators will often be chosen from the
conservatee's immediate family, since family members are most likely to appreciate the
conservatee's personal values." Noting that California's Probate Code preferred designated
family members as conservators, the court observed, "Since immediate family members are
likely to have some testamentary or beneficial interest, an inflexible rule in this area would
often eliminate those persons most qualified to serve as conservators." Id.). This reasoning
would surely apply to a number of instances, particularly where the patient is an adult,
Illinois's surrogate decision-making statute includes a provision that "The surrogate shall not
be liable merely because the surrogate may benefit from the act, has individual or conflicting
interests in relation to the care and affairs of the patient, or acts in a different manner with
respect to the patient's and the surrogate's own care or interests." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,
para. 851-30(c) (Supp. 1992). Illinois' explicit faith in surrogates who may also be heirs is
implicit in almost all other surrogacy statutes, which list as authorized decision-makers
spouses, parents, children, and siblings, all of whom are potential heirs at probate. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214 (Michie Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West
1989); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-107(d) (1990 & Supp. 1991); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.009 (West. Supp. 1992).
120. See, e.g., Colyer, 660 P.2d 738; Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840; In re Barry, 445
So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct, App. 1984) ("[D]ecisions of this character have traditionally
been made within the privacy of the family relationship based on competent medical advice
and consultation by the family with their religious advisors, if that be their persuasion"); In re
L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) ("[N]atural bonds of affection lead parents to act in
the best interests of their children") (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979), see
supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text). See also DECID]NG TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at
127-28 (citing five reasons why family members are the best surrogate decision-makers,
beginning with, "The family is generally most concerned about the good of the patient").
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desire.121 These considerations might raise troubling conflicts in other medical
contexts. Here, however, the requirement that parents receive a firm PVS diag-
nosis, with a prognosis of no reasonable hope of return to consciousness, before
they can decide to withdraw life support systems, mitigates substantial conflict-
of-interest concerns. Some commentators have indeed suggested that when the
diagnosis is clear, it is altogether appropriate for decision-makers to take into
account general family interests1 22 as well as their own religious viewpoint.
123
3. Cases of Abuse or Neglect
The Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R. specifically acknowledged an obli-
gation on the part of parents "to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and
follow medical advice" 1 24 All states include medical neglect as grounds for state
intervention in their child abuse statutes,125 and a finding of neglect is the com-
mon predicate for ordering medical care for a minor over parental objection, even
when that objection is religiously based. 126 Involved medical personnel have a
statutory duty to seek government intervention in situations where they suspect
child abuse or neglect. 127 As with conflict of interest criteria, however, abuse or
121. See generally Gibbs, supra note 32. The article recounts the agonies of the Cruzans
and other families of terminal or PVSpatients, and quotes Pete Busalacchi, Christine's father:
"This has been a 34-month funeral." Id. at 62. See also Griffith v. Florida, 548 So. 2d 244, 245
(Fla. App. 1989) (distraught defendant shot his three-year-old PVS daughter in her hospital
bed because "I didn't want her to suffer anymore"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Pete Busalacchi, How Can They?, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 6; Rebecca S. Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual
Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 395-96 (1986); Goldman et
al., supra note 26, at 301 (noting the impact of Sammy Linares' condition on the rest of the
family, particularly the sister who had allowed him to play with her balloon, which he
aspirated); John A. Hardwig, What About the Family?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr.
1990, at 5-6; DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at 185.
122. The concept of the need for developing a family-centered medical ethic (and
concomitant laws), particularly in cases of the kind at issue here, has recently been gaining
increasing ground. See Dresser, supra note 121, at 395; Gostin, supra note 23, at 297 ("The
right to privacy that is actually being asserted is a right belonging to the family unit which
includes the patient!'); Hardwig, supra note 121, at 5i King, supra note 15; Hilde Lindemann
Nelson, The Patient and the Family, THE HASTINGS CENTER CENTERPIECE, Dec. 1991, at 5;
James Lindemann Nelson, Taking Families Seriously, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug.
1992, at 6; Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 437-39
(1988). For earlier expressions of similar ideas, see Ferdinand Schoeman, Parental Discretion
and Children's Rights: Background and Implications for Medical Decision-Making, 10 J.
MED. & PHIL. 45 (1985); Robert M. Veatch, Limits of Guardian Treatment Refusal: A
Reasonableness Standard, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 427, 436-37 (1984). But see Charles H. Baron,
Why Withdrawal of Life-Support for PVS Patients Is Not a Family Decision, 19 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 73 (1991) (suggesting, however, that we spare families the burdens posed by
PVS patients by broadening the definition of death to include this condition).
123. The family's consultation with religious advisers is approvingly noted in several
cases; see In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Rosebush, No. 88
349180 AZ, slip op. at 8 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Oakland County July 29, 1988); In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647,657-58 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
124. 442 U.S. 584,602 (1979). See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying'text.
125. MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 35, at 96; Holder, supra note 35, § 19.05[l];
Rothenberg, supra note 35, § 8-2.3(b). See also Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1989), and regulations thereunder, 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(2)(i)
(1991) (providing funding to appropriate state and local agencies; "negligent treatment or
maltreatment" specifically includes "failure to provide adequate ... medical care").
126. See Williams, supra note 103; Rampino, supra note 103.
127. MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 35, at 96; Holder, supra note 35, § 19.0512];
Rothenberg, supra note 35, § 8-2.3(b).
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neglect appears to be a highly questionable finding if based solely on a parental
decision to withhold or withdraw life sustaining treatment in the face of a con-
firmed diagnosis of persistent vegetative state. On the other hand, any situation
where there is reason to suspect that a PVS child has been the victim of parental
abuse or neglect poses an appropriate case for judicial intervention; a court
should at least terminate the suspected parent's authority, leaving the decision in
the hands of the remaining parent.128
4. Conflict Between Parents
If both parents of a child in a diagnosed persistent vegetative state are rea-
sonably available, both should agree to the request to withhold or withdraw life
sustaining treatment before it is acted upon. This should be true regardless of
whether the parents are still married or living together, and regardless of which is
the custodial parent. In the words of one court, "parental rights ... are fully
vested in each individual parent, not shared as a parental unit."'
129
On the other hand, if a disagreement on the issue should persist over a long
period of time, such as six months or more, without any change in the patient's
condition, the parent wishing to end treatment should be entitled to resort to a
court and request the appointment of a guardian ad litem to make recommenda-
tions for resolution in a judicial proceeding.130 At some point, it seems just as
128. This was the situation in In re Baby Doe, No. D-62058, slip op. at 9 (Ga. Super. Ct.
Fulton County Nov. 30, 1988), where suspected child abuse on the father's part resulted in
deprivation of his "right to speak for the child," and the conclusion that "the Court and the
mother must make the decision for the child." The case was governed by In re LH.R., 321
S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) ("In a case of suspected neglect or abuse ... the parent's right to
speak for the child may be lost"). See also In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 368-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984). An abusive parent may in fact be likely to oppose withdrawal of life support from
a PVS child, out of fear of criminal charges based on homicide. Dority v. Superior Court, 193
Cal. Rptr. 288,292 (Ct. App. 1983); In re Haymer, 450 N.E.2d 940 (11. App. Ct. 1983).
129. In re Doe, No. D-93064, slip op. at 16 (Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton County Oct. 17,
1991), aff'd 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992). Even if the parents are separated or only one has
custody, the basic presumption recognized in Parham v. J.R. that parents have their children's
best interests at heart should apply equally, at least until proven otherwise. The six states that
have enacted statutes specifically dealing with surrogate/family decision-making for minors,
see supra note 21, have generally recognized this, but not always with sufficient protection for
each parent's interests: see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-214(2) (Michie Supp. 1991) (naming,
"in the case of an unmarried patient under the age of eighteen (18), theparents of the patient")
(emphasis added); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-25(a) (Supp. 1992) ("either parent
of the patient," but in the case of disagreement, the parent with custodial rights controls unless
the parent without custodial rights initiates guardianship proceedings); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-
8-12-4(b) (Burns 1990 & Supp. 1992) ("a parent" if there is no appointed guardian; no
specific provision made for parental disagreement); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.6
(Supp. 1992) ("either the parent or guardian," but that person may not make the statutory
declaration if he or she "has actual notice of opposition" by the other parent); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-7-4 (Michie 1991) (same); "1)x. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.006 (West
1992) ("the patient's parents"). In re Doe, No. D-93064 (Ga. Super Ct. Fulton County Oct. 17,
1991) presented a situation where the child's mother appeared willing to accede to a
recommended "do-not-resuscitate" order but did not wish life support withdrawn, while her
father not only wished to maintain life support, but also to use resuscitative measures in the
event of cardiac or respiratory arrest. The judge ruled that in such a case the court must "yield
to the presumption in favor of life," id. slip op. at 18; the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, but
based its holding on custodial rights. 418 S.E.2d 3, 7 (Ga. 1992).
130. One parent may be hoping that "nature will take its course" without the need for an
active decision. That appeared to be the mother's position in In re Doe; she was willing to
commit to writing her apparent agreement to a "do-not-resuscitate" order, and, in the court's
words, was "not sure whether she would like to see Jane's life supporting medical procedure
[VOL. 35
WITHDRAWAL OF TREATMENT
cruel to force the parent desiring closure to endure prolongation of the child's
dying process as it is initially to force the parent favoring life support to endure
withdrawal of treatment against that parent's wishes. Similarly, if the parent
desiring termination of treatment has reasonable grounds to believe that the dis-
senting parent's refusal to act is based upon ulterior considerations, 131 judicial
intervention would be in order.132
5. Where a Mature Minor Has Expressed an Opinion
Although the execution of a valid advance directive requires attainment of
the age of majority,133 it may be that a minor capable of understanding the impli-
cations of the situation has in fact expressed her wishes about life-sustaining
treatment in the event that she should fall into a persistent vegetative state. If so,
should the minor's known declarations be sufficient to override her parents'
decision?
The wishes of older minors to refuse life-sustaining measures have been
decisive in two reported cases. In In re Swan,134 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine held that where a normally mature high school senior was left in a persis-
tent vegetative state by an auto accident at age seventeen and one-third, his prior
"serious and deliberative"'135 statements that he would not want to be maintained
in that condition must be respected by health care professionals.136 In In.re
E.G.,137 the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the right of a seventeen-year-old
deescalated." In re Doe, No. D-93064, slip op. at 7 (Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton County Oct. 17,
1991), affia, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga, 1992). Some of the medical personnel involved in the case of
Samuel Linares also have indicated that one reason why the hospital did not attempt more
actively to assist Mr. Linares in seeking legal resolution of the dilemma was that Sammy was
expected to die at almost any moment. Goldman et al., supra note 26, at 302. Reluctance to
reach the decision was also evident in In re Rosebush, No. 88 349180 AZ (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Oakland County July 29, 1988), appeal filed, No. 111082 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). After
agonizing for 15 months, the parents finally decided to terminate care, only to find themselves
confronted by a courtroom proceeding.
131. For example, animosity between parents, as in situations where there has been a
bitter divorce, could lead one to oppose the other's wishes on that basis alone, without regard
to the child's best interests or to other relevant considerations. In that case, the parent seeking
resolution should have the opportunity to disqualify the other as decision-maker by evidence
concerning the other's motives, presented to an impartial tribunal.
132. One reason why judicial intervention should normally be unnecessary in these
cases is that usually they are not truly adversarial proceedings. Where an adversarial posture
continues to exist between the parties vested with decision-making power, resort to the court
process seems appropriate.
133. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (noting that a few states allow
emancipated minors to sign advance directives).
134. 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990).
135. Id. at 1203.
136. The court held that Chad Swan's case was governed by its earlier decision of In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987), which concerned a 21-year-old patient. In re Swan, 569
A.2d 1202, 1204 (Me. 1990).
137. 549 N.E.2d 322 1l. 1990) (a combination of transfusions and chemotherapy would
achieve remission in about 80% of such patients, although long-term survival prospects were
only 20'-25%; without the treatments, the patient was expected to die within a month). Citing
statutes permitting minors to make medical and other kinds of decisions prior to age 18, as
well as cases recognizing constitutionally protected rights of minors, the court held that a trial
court must find the minor to be sufficiently mature to make the medical decision under a clear
and convincing standard of evidence. i. at 327. Furthermore, "If a parent or guardian opposes
an unemancipated minor's refusal to consent to treatment for a life-threatening health problem,
this opposition would weigh heavily against the minor's right to refuse." Id. at 328 (note,
however, that the parent's opposition apparently would not be dispositive).
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leukemia victim to refuse blood transfusions on religious grounds, and specifi-
cally found her acquiescing mother not to be guilty of neglect. In other cases as
well, older minors who asserted agreement with their parents' religious beliefs
and refused medical treatment on that basis have had their wishes respected by
courts.
13 8
In all these cases, the minors and their parents have been in agreement.
When that is the situation, this Article argues that the parents' agreement alone
suffices to control the decision without judicial intervention, and therefore no
inquiry need be made about even an older child's expression of views. It follows
that so long as the two parents are in agreement with each other, the same result
should obtain even if an older minor has expressed a differing viewpoint,139
unless the state legislature has lowered the age of competence to choose to
forego life-sustaining treatment. This is true because the objective of any legisla-
tion concerning refusal-of-treatment choices should be to keep the issue out of
the courts except when necessary to protect the patient's rights or to resolve
disputes. Thus, statutes providing for surrogate decision-makers often state that
the named actor is to make choices in accordance with the patient's own likely
preferences, where possible, or in accordance with the patient's best interests; but
in any event, the person is empowered to decide without court supervision. 40
The basic underlying premise for these statutes is that the patient could have exe-
cuted an advance directive but failed to do so. If the patient is a minor and the
legislature wishes to accord the same weight to the minor's known preferences as
it accords to the preferences of a formerly competent adult, then it can do so sim-
ply by lowering the age of capacity for making refusal-of-treatment decisions on
one's own. Any other approach leads back to the courtroom, for when a minor's
parents agree on the decision, there is only one way in which the minor's views
could be used to override their choice: someone would have to challenge the par-
ents in an adversarial proceeding and prove to the satisfaction of a judge that the
minor had clearly expressed a differing viewpoint in a thoughtful, reflective
manner.
138. In re D.L.E., 614 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1980) (12-year-old boy with seizures permitted
to remain with mother, where both believed in spiritual healing); In re Green, 307 A.2d 279
(Pa. 1973) (17-year-old who objected to surgery was not neglected child, where surgery was
not matter of life or death). Cf In re Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (finding particular minor to be immature, but finding "much merit" in
mature minor doctrine and suggesting its adoption by legislature and appellate courts); In re
Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1955) (noting that if minor with harelip and cleft palate wanted
corrective surgery, his wishes would override parental religious objections).
139. The legislatures of some states that specifically permit surrogate decision-making
for minors do not necessarily agree with this point. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.6
(Supp. 1992) (a surrogate decision-maker may not make a declaration for a terminally ill minor
"[i]f he has actual notice of contrary indications by the minor who is terminally ill," although
the reach of this provision with respect to making decisions for minors is unclear, as elsewhere
the statute stipulates that the making of a declaration is "a nonexclusive means by which life-
sustaining procedures may be withheld or withdrawn," § 40:1299.58.8C.(1)); N.M. STAT.ANN.
§ 24-7-8.1 (Michie 1991) (same); again, there is ambiguity, due to the statute's preservation
of rights clause at § 24-7-9, "Nothing in the Right to Die Act ... shall impair or supersede any
existing legal right or legal responsibility which any person may have to effect the withholding
or nonutilization of any maintenance medical treatment in any lawful manner"; TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.007 (West 1992) ("The desire of a competent qualified patient,
including a competent qualified patient younger than 18 years of age, supersedes the effect of a
directive"); again, there is ambiguity because of the preservation of rights clause at § 672.021.
140. See infra notes 144-46.
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On the other hand, if a minor's parents disagree with each other, an adver-
sarial proceeding might well be initiated by one of them.14 1 In that case, the
thoughtfully expressed views of an older minor ought to be introduced into evi-
dence. If both the child's maturity and the deliberative nature of the verbal ex-
pression are demonstrable by clear and convincing evidence, those findings
should have substantial probative weight, although other considerations might
well enter into the judge's final decision.142
C. Good Faith as the Governing Standard
Given competent, loving parents of unquestionable motive who mutually agree
on behalf of their minor child to forego life-sustaining treatment, the only condi-
tion which should be necessary to validate their decision is a confirmed medical
diagnosis of persistent vegetative state, with an accompanying prognosis of no
reasonable hope of return to consciousness. 143 Some state statutes authorizing
surrogate decision-making to forego life-sustaining measures take this approach
and offer no guidelines other than medical criteria.14 Others, however, make it
clear that the decision-maker is to act according to the patient's intentions, where
141. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. Logic suggests that ordinarily the
party bringing the action would be the parent seeking to change the status quo-i.e., the one
wishing to withdraw life support systems.
142. There are pitfalls in stating that even the mature minor's known wishes should
control when parents disagree with each other. If the minor's views were based upon
unrealistic expectations belied by the medical diagnosis and prognosis ("I'm young; maybe if
they kept me on machines for 20 years someone would discover a miracle cure"), then the
judge might find other factors more persuasive, such as the reasons for the disagreement
between the two parents, their apparent motives, and the medical evidence itself. In a truly
adversarial proceeding, the impartial factfinder should be free to weigh the evidence in a
manner that appears appropriate to the individual situation. Any decision on behalf of a patient
in a persistent vegetative state-even a patient who has made definitive wishes known-has a
hypothetical element to it, because no one can give truly "informed consent" ahead of time.
See Dresser, supra note 121, at 381; Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality of Life
and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach,
17 LAW, ME). & HEALTH CARE 234,236 (1989); John A. Robertson, Second Thoughts About
Living Wills, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 6. In Werth v. Taylor, 475 N.W.2d
426 (Mich. App. 1991), the court followed this reasoning to find that a hospital properly
refused to honor a pregnant woman's refusal to accept blood transfusions because she signed
the refusal anticipating an ordinary delivery, but unexpectedly required lifesaving postnatal
surgery.
143. It seems safe to say that a reliable diagnosis of PVS by definition entails a
prognosis of no reasonable hope of return to consciousness. There have apparently been only
two reported cases of return to consciousness after PVS was believed to have been reliably
diagnosed. One of these patients suffered from paralysis of three limbs accompanied by
emotional instability, and was completely dependent for the rest of his life. The other
recovered normal cognitive functioning but suffered from "locked-in syndrome," a condition
of complete paralysis, where blinking was his only possible form of communication.
DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at 179 n.22; cited in Cranford, supra note 1, at 30 n.8.
144. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214 (Michie Supp. 1991) (providing for appointment of
a surrogate decision-maker who would have authority to execute a valid advance directive
when the patient is a minor or an incompetent adult); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-21(a) (Supp.
1988) ("In the absence of a declaration, ordinary standards of current medical practice will be
followed"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1990 & Supp. 1991) (physician and named surrogate
may decide to terminate treatment when the patient's condition meets specified medical
criteria); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635 (1991) (life-sustaining measures may be withdrawn
provided that medical criteria are met and the terminal condition is confirmed by a committee
of physicians); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107 (1991) (physician and named surrogate may
agree to withdraw life-sustaining procedures when medical criteria are met and another
physician concurs in the diagnosis).
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possible (the "substituted judgment" standard 145) or to act in the patient's best
interests.146 Eschewing both the ambiguities of "what the patient would desire"'147
and the conundrum posed by the "best interests ' 148 of a permanently unconscious
patient, the surrogate decision-making provision of the Uniform Rights of the
Terminally ill Act149 combines the medical standard with respect for the declared
wishes of the patient:
145. Arizona Living Wills and Health Care Directives Act, 1992 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 193
(West) (to be codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231(A)) (surrogate "shall follow the
patient's wishes if they are known"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (Supp. 1992) (the
attending physician is insulated from liability in a medically appropriate situation when he has
obtained the informed consent of the patient's next of kin, if known, or legal guardian, if any,
and "has considered the patient's wishes as expressed by the patient directly, through his next
of kin or legal guardian, or in the form of a document ...."); Health Care Advance Directives,
1992 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 92-199, sec. 765.401(2) (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 765.401(2)) (proxy must act as patient would have "under the circumstances," but
decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment "must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence" that patient would want such treatment withdrawn); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.1
(West 1989) (surrogates "shall be guided by the express or implied intentions of the patient");
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107(d) (1990 & Supp. 1991), as interpreted by 73 Op.
Att'y Gen. 88-046 (Oct. 17, 1988) (withdrawal of treatment is lawful only if "foregoing
treatment is what the disabled person would want done"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1.A
(Michie 1991) (life-sustaining treatment may be terminated "when all family members who
can be contacted through reasonable diligence agree in good faith that the patient, if
competent, would choose to forego that treatment"); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie
1991), as amended by 1992 Va. Acts ch. 748 (decision must be based on patient's "religious
beliefs and basic values and any preferences previously expressed"); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 672.009(c) (West 1992) (surrogate's decision on behalf of incompetent adult "must be
based on knowledge of what the patient would desire, if known"); WYO. STAT. § 35-22-
105(b) (1991), as amended by 1992 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 80 (all family members must agree
that if competent, patient would choose to forego treatment). Some statutes provide that a
decision to withhold or withdraw treatment is invalid if the surrogate decision-maker has
actual notice of the patient's contrary wishes. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106
(1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.626 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (Michie 1991);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.08 (Baldwin Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.58.6.B (West 1992); TEX. HEALTH& SAFErY CODE ANN. § 672.006 (West 1992).
Three statutes concerning minors have similar provisions; see-supra note 139. For discussion
of the substituted judgment doctrine, see supra notes 45-83 and accompanying text.
146. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210(b) (1989) (when patient's wishes are unknown,
surrogate's decision must be based on "a good faith belief as to the best interests of the
patient"); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-20 (Supp. 1992) (when adult patient's
wishes are unknown, "the decision shall be made on the basis of the patient's best interests"
with surrogate decision-maker using benefit and burden analysis to determine best interests);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-4(d) (Burns 1990 & Supp. 1992), as interpreted by In re
Lawrance, 579 NE.2d 32 (Ind. 1991) (person authorized to consent "shall act in good faith and
in the best interest of the individual incapable of consenting"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-
A, § 5-707 (Supp. 1990) (providing that "[a] decision to grant or withhold consent must be
made in the best interest of the individual consistent with the individual's desires, if known,
and in good faith. A consent is not valid if it conflicts with the expressed intention of the
individual." Furthermore, "[any person with a significant relationship with the individual may
petition a court of competent jurisdiction to determine whether a decision made" in accordance
with the statute actually meets the specified criteria); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-
107(d) (Supp. 1992), as interpreted by 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 88-046 (Oct. 17, 1988) (when
patient's preference is unknown, family member must determine best interests).
147. See, e.g., TX. HEALTH & SAFErY CODEANN. § 672.009(c), supra note 145.
148. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210(b) (1989), supra note 146. See also infra
notes 168-74 and accompanying text (discussing the "best interests" test).
149. Unif. Rights of the Terminally Ill Act § 7, 9B U.L.A. 96, 109 (Supp. 1989). The
addition of § 7 was the primary change to the original act, Unif. Rights of the Terminally Ill
Act, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1987), made by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1989; Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 97 (Supp. 1989).
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A decision [by a surrogate 150 to grant or withhold consent [to the with-
holding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment]151 must be made in
good faith. A consent is not valid if it conflicts with the expressed inten-
tion of the individual. 152
It is clear from both the context of this provision 53 and the appended comment' 54
that the Act contemplates only once-competent adult patients,
The suggestion presented here is that the simple "good faith" requirement
of the Uniform Act is the appropriate standard for parental decision-making for
minors in a persistent vegetative state. While neither the Act nor its comments
define its specified "good faith," the concept as used there undoubtedly refers to
honest conformity with the statute's provisions. This would include appropriate
reliance on the requisite medical diagnosis; 55 belief that the qualified patient has
no effective declaration;156 belief that one belongs to the appropriate priority
class of designated surrogates;157 and belief that one's decision does not "conflict
with the expressed intention of the individual."158 Because termination of treat-
ment is a medically reasonable choice for a PVS patient,159 a "good faith" stan-
dard for parental decision-making on behalf of minor children would require
only an absence of the disqualifying factors already discussed 60 and appropriate
reliance on the requisite medical diagnosis. This approach respects the values of
family privacy with no compromise to the patient's rights or to the state's legiti-
mate interests in the decision-making process. As the next section shows, it
serves all these concerns more satisfactorily than does application of either the
150. The Act designates surrogates in order of priority. Id. § 7(b).151. Id/. § 7(a).
152. Id. §7(d).
153. Section 7 applies to "an individual who: (1) [meets the medical criteria and is] no
longer able to make decisions regarding administration of life-sustaining treatment; and (2) has
no effective declaration." Iai § 7(a). Any individual who once could have made such a decision
(as presumed by §7(a)(l)) or could have made a declaration (§ 7(a)(2)) would have to be a
"qualified patient" under the Act: "a patient [18][sic] or more years of age ...." Id § 1(7). (The
bracket around the number 18 indicates that a state is to choose its own qualifying age; the
Commissioners undoubtedly chose 18 as the common age of majority.) See also id. § 2(a)
(specifying age for making a declaration, again suggested by the Act as age 18).
154. Id. § 7, comment:
Section 7 authorizes binding consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatmentfor qualified patients. Members of the patient's family in
designated priority order may consent to withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment, and such consent will be treated as if the individual had
given it. Consent by the designated family members, however, must be given in
good faith, and is not valid if it would conflict with the expressed intention of
the patient.
Id (emphases supplied). A "qualified patient" is defined by the Act as "a patient [18] or more
years of age .... Id, § 1(7). In the appropriate context (e.g., circumstances that would call § 7
into play), it also refers to a patient who has "been determined to be in a terminal condition."
Id comment.
155. Id. § 1(4) (defining "life-sustaining treatment") and § 1(9) (defining "terminal
condition") and comment; id. § 3 and comment (specifying when a declaration becomes
operative).
156. Id. § 7(a)(2).
157. Id. §7(b), (c).
158. Id. § 7(d).
159. See infra notes 202-18 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 105-32 and accompanying text.
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"substituted judgment" standard or the "best interests" test commonly applied by
courts16 1 and, as noted, frequently adopted by statutes. 162
1. The Problems with "Tests" in Relation to the PVS Minor
The "substituted judgment" standard developed in Quinlan and relied upon
by most courts considering treatment withdrawal cases163 arguably makes sense
when the patient is a formerly competent adult who has expressed actual prefer-
ences or whose general life views and values are ascertainable. Application of the
self-determination concept promotes the values of equality among patients and of
respect for autonomous decision-making, 64 thereby preserving the principle of
informed consent so key to legitimate medical treatment or its refusal. 65 Even so,
there is at least an element of fiction inherent in any substitution of one person's
judgment for another's; when the subject of the decision has never been compe-
tent, the degree of unreality is sufficient to compel abandonment of the analytical
enterprise as unworkable.
A number of analysts have recognized the flaws inherent in applying the
substituted judgment concept to never-competent patients, including minors. 66
One of these was the authoritative President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 67 As
early as 1983, the President's Commission recommended that decision-makers
for never-competent patients try to act in the patient's best interests, taking into
account "such factors as the relief of suffering, the preservation or restoration of
functioning, and the quality as well as the extent of life sustained."168 The
Commission was careful to define its use of the phrase "quality of life" to refer to
161. See cases cited supra note 31 (applying substituted judgment); cases cited infra
note 171 (applying the "best interests" test).
162. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 31.
164. See, e.g., In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (" ... the
constitutional right of privacy would be an empty right if one who is incompetent were not
granted the right of a competent counterpart to exercise his rights"); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (Mass. 1977) ("The recognition of
that right [to refuse medical treatment] must extend to the case of an incompetent, as well as a
competent, patient because the value of human dignity extends to both"); In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647, 664 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) ("If a putative decision by Karen to
permit this non-cognitive, vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a
valuable incident of her right of privacy, as we believe it to be, then it should not be discarded
solely on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice"). See also
DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at 132-33.
165. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
166. See generally Dresser, supra note 121; Rebecca Dresser, Relitigating Life ahd
Death, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 425 (1991); Dresser & Robertson, supra note 142; Rhoden, supra
note 122; John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions
for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139, 1159-63 (1991); Veatch, supra note 122. See
also ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF
SURROGATE DECISION MAKING (1983), at 112-22.
167. DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at 132-34. The President's Commission
was established by federal statute in 1978 and completed its work (the issuance of some
thirteen volumes of reports, including appendices) in 1983. According to one source, it
considered its role "as primarily educational, and ... became a vehicle for developing a
national consensus on policies that would inevitably be incorporated into law." BARRY R.
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW (2d ed. 1991), at 1220. As such, it has remained one of the
"most constantly cited sources on every issue ... studied." Id.
168. DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at 135.
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"the value of the patient's life for the patient. 1 69 In 1986, the American Medical
Association, through its Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, issued a state-
ment manifesting its agreement:
In treating a terminally ill or irreversibly comatose patient, the physician
should determine whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its burdens.
At all times, the dignity of the patient should be maintained. 170
Some courts71 ' and commentators, 172 as well as some statutes, 173 have heeded this
reasoning and called for withdrawal-of-treatment decisions to be made in light of
the patient's best interests. As suggested by the President's Commission and the
AMA's Council, application of the best interests standard generally involves
weighing the benefits to the patient conferred by treatment against the burdens
imposed on the patient by the medical procedures employed. 74
Often cases which purport to apply a substituted judgment framework in
fact speak in terms of the patient's best interests, or at least intertwine the two
modes of analysis, or conclude that either would lead to the same result. For
example, in Custody of a Minor, the Massachusetts Supreme Court--the first to
apply the substituted judgment test to never-competent patients175-quoted one
of its own earlier applications of the doctrine to a medical decision on behalf of a
minor:
In a case like this one, involving a child who is incompetent by reason of
his tender years, we think that the substituted judgment doctrine is consis-
tent with the 'best interests of the child' test. It is true that, when applying
169. Id. at 135 n.43.
170. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING LIFE PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT,
Mar. 15, 1986 [hereinafter, AMA COUNCIL STATEMENT]. Accord, Position of the American
Academy of Neurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of the Persistent
Vegetative State Patient, 39 NEUROLOGY 125, 125-26 (Jan. 1989) [hereinafter, Am. AcadJ of
Neurology]. See also Guidelines on the Vegetative State: Commentary on the American
Academy of Neurology statement, 39 NEUROLOGY 123, 123-24 [hereinafter Guidelines].
171. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (if guardian is unable
to use substituted judgment, best interests approach should govern); In re Drabick, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 840 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983) (best interests approach should be used if it is not possible to
ascertain patient's choice); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (substituted judgment
and best interests intermingled in court's language); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987)
(guardian should use substituted judgment, if possible, or best interest standard; here, daughter
had never been competent and mother's determination of her best interests was appropriate); In
re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984) (guardian has duty to act in best interests of ward).
172. See Dresser, supra note 121; Dresser, supra note 166; Dresser & Robertson, supra
note 142; Robertson, supra note 166, at 1194-95; John A. Robertson, Assessing Quality of
I.fe: A Response to Professor Kamisar, 25 GA. L. REV. 1243 (1991).
173. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-4(d) (Burns 1990 & Supp. 1992), as interpreted by In
re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991). Some statutes apply the best interests standard when
the wishes of the patient are unknown. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 12, para. 851-20(1)
(Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210(b) (1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-
107(d) (1990 & Supp. 1991), as interpreted by 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 88--048 (Oct. 17, 1988); VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986(A) (Michie 1991), as amended by 1992 Va. Acts ch. 748.
174. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 217-18, 741 P.2d 674, 684-85 (1987)
(quoting AMA COUNCIL STATEMENT, supra note 170); In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 861
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
491 (Ct. App. 1983); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 338 (Minn. 1984) (quoting DECIDING TO
FOREGO, supra note 108); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 454,457 (Wash. 1987).
175. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977). See supra notes 57-63, and accompanying text.
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the 'best interests' test, the inquiry is essentially objective in nature, and
the decisions are made not by, but on behalf of, the child ...
Nevertheless, the best interests analysis, like that of the substituted judg-
ment doctrine, requires a court to focus on the various factors unique to
the situation of the individual for whom it must act.... [sic] As a practical
matter, the criteria to be examined and the basic applicable reasoning are
the same.176
Similarly, in In re Barry,177 a Florida appellate court noted that the substituted
judgment test "is difficult to apply to children or young adults." 17 8 Although it
still maintained that the trial court's use of that standard was correct, 179 the court
did not proceed to talk in terms of a "lucid interval"' 80 or attempt to "don the
mental mantle" 8' of the child. Instead, it stated that "the court must be guided
primarily by the judgment of the parents who are responsible for their child's
well-being, provided, of course, that their judgment is supported by competent
medical evidence."'182 In In re LH.R.,183 the Georgia Supreme Court, after a thor-
ough discussion of the Barry case, 84 followed its application of a substituted
judgment framework. The Georgia court also cited Parham v. J.R., however, and
noted that "the right of the parent to speak for the minor child is so imbedded in
our tradition and common law" that, absent suspected neglect, abuse, or other
posture which might endanger the child, "the beginning presumption is that the
parent has the child's best interest at heart. '18 5 The court held that the child's
parent or guardian may exercise the child's right to forego life-sustaining treat-
'ment without judicial intervention, once there has been a confirmed medical
diagnosis of irreversible persistent vegetative state. 8 6 Indeed, the court extended
its holding to encompass a family right to make refusal-of-treatment decisions
for incompetent adult patients who have no advance directive. 8 7
Thus, courts dealing with decision-making for minors, obviously mindful
of traditional parental rights and responsibilities, have tended to mix the lan-
176. Custody of a Minor, 434 N.E.2d 601,608--9 n.10 (Mass. 1982) (quoting Custody
of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1065 (Mass. 1978) (other citations omitted). But see In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-32 (NJ. 1985) (identifying and defining three tests: substituted
judgment (where once-competent patient's wishes were known), on the one hand, and two
"best interests" tests, on the other-a "limited objective" test, where there is some trustworthy
evidence of the patient's general views, and a "pure objective" benefit/burden analysis,
applicable when trustworthy evidence is lacking that the patient would have declined life-
sustaining treatment). The New Jersey Supreme Court later held that the Conroy "best
interests" tests do not apply to PVS patients; rather, such cases are governed by Quinlan. In re
Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 423-24 (NJ. 1987); see also In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 443 (N.J. 1987)
(decided the same day as Peter).
177. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
178. Id. at 371.
179. Id.
180. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,663 (NJ.), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 922 (1976). See
supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
181. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431
(Mass. 1977) (citations omitted). See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
182. In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added).
183. 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984).
184. Id. at718-19.
185. Id. at 722 (emphasis added). See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text
(discussing Parham v. J.R., where the Supreme Court relied on a basic presumption that
parents generally act in the best interests of their children).
186. Id at 722-23.
187. Id. at 723.
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guages of substituted judgment and of the child's best interests. As a guiding
standard for a court, or for any non-parental decision-maker, the best interests of
the child test appears to present fewer conceptual difficulties than does a tortuous
attempt at "substituted judgment" for a person who was never legally capable of
making the decision. The best interests standard is, after all, the traditional crite-
rion for decision-making when the state asserts its parens patriae power to pro-
tect minors in guardianship proceedings or to make decisions regarding their
welfare in disputed situations.188
Even though a best interests standard may be more analytically satisfactory
than a substituted judgment approach, it is not without flaws. Some analysts find
that it rests upon an even more disturbing fiction than substituted judgment-
namely, the assumption that death could ever be in the "best interests" of anyone,
particularly a child.189 Because concern for the patient's welfare is the value
underlying the best interests framework,190 its benefit/burden analysis does nec-
essarily entail a conclusion about the patient's "quality of life."'191 To engage in
such an enterprise, critics assert, violates basic notions of equality and under-
mines the state's interest in preserving life;192 some fear the "slippery slope" of
188. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 37, § 19.1 (discussing custody of children);
Robertson, supra note 165, at 1170; Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz,
370 NE.2d 417,427 (Mass. 1977) ("the State has a traditional power and responsibility, under
the doctrine of parens patriae, to care for and protect the 'best interests' of the incompetent
person"). See also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 221, 741 P.2d 674, 688 (1987),
appeal dismissed, 1993 WL 32356 (Mo. Jan. 26, 1993) (Arizona caselaw holds "best interests"
to govern guardianship); In re Busalacehi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App.
Mar. 5, 1991) (citing state guardianship statute), appeal dismissed; 1993 WL 32356 (Mo. Jan.
26, 1993); In re Grant, 747 P.2d. 445, 457 (Wash. 1987); In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1375
(Wash. 1984) (citing state guardianship statute). Cf. In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 338 (Minn.
1984) (state law requires the probate court to "act in the 'best interests' of the ward or
conservatee in a guardianship proceeding").
189. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (state statute
empowering guardian to consent to medical care on ward's behalf does not include the power
to consent to withdrawal of life support); id. at 425 (as delegatee of state's parens patriae
power, guardian may not consent to terminate ward's life support); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d
64, 73 (N.Y. 1981) (profoundly retarded adult should be assessed as an infant, and a parent
"may not deprive a child of life saving treatment, however well intentioned"). Cf. In re
Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26581, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991) (guardian has
affirmative duty to act in ward's best interest and to procure appropriate medical care), appeal
dismissed, 1993 WL 32356 (Mo. Jan. 26, 1993); 1991 WL 26581 at *8-11 (court, acting under
parens patriae duty to act in ward's best interests, could appropriately prohibit guardian from
moving ward to another jurisdiction, where guardian might remove ward's feeding tube after
medical evaluation). Cf. also Yale Kamisar, When Is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"?
When Is There No Constitutional "Right to Live"?, 25 GA. L. REv. 1203 (1991).
190. See DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at 135.
191. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text; DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note
108, at 135 n.43 (clarifying the Commission's concern as "the value of the patient's life for the
patient," as distinguished from "the value that others find in the continuation of the patient's
life, perhaps in terms of their estimates of the patient's actual or potential productivity or social
contribution"). See also BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 166, at 123-24; Dresser, supra note
166, at 430; Dresser & Robertson, supra note 142, at 242; Robertson, supra note 172. Cf.
Nancy K. Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Qualify of Life Counts,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1318-23 (1985).
192. This criticism has been leveled at all third party withdrawal-of-treatment decision-
making on behalf of incompetent patients, whether based on substituted judgment or best
interests analysis. See In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 306 (Ill. 1989) (Ward, J., dissenting)
(noting that a surrogate cannot help judging the patient's quality of life on the surrogate's own
terms, thereby entailing the "risk that the surrogate will allow the patient to die simply because
he is incompetent"); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 422 (Mo. 1988) (accusing Quinlan
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arrogating to surrogate decision-makers the potential power to withdraw treat-
ment from persons considered "burdensome" or "undesirable," such as the senile
or profoundly retarded. 193
A number of commentators who support the best interests standard as gen-
erally appropriate for medical decision-making on behalf of incompetent patients
nonetheless maintain that it cannot be applied to patients in a persistent vegeta-
tive state because by definition these persons have no interests susceptible of
evaluation. 194 Anyone suffering a total loss of consciousness is incapable of
"benefitting" from continued life support; by the same token, such a person is not
"burdened" by invasive medical procedures, because, so far as we can ascertain,
the patient has no sensations of pain and certainly no awareness of any dignitary
interest at stake.195 If the loss of consciousness is permanent and irreversible, the
language of "burden/benefit" rests upon notions just as fictitious' 96 as the concept
of "substituted judgment." For analysts persuaded by this line of argument, a best
interests approach to PVS patients poses a conundrum incapable of resolution.
2. Who Is the Best Decision-Maker?
Clearly, various parties contemplating treatment decisions for a child in a
persistent vegetative state-whether they be jurists, health care providers, com-
mentators, or family or friends of such a patient-will bring different perspec-
tives and values to the decision-making process. Under these circumstances, the
primary question is not, "Which standard should apply?" but rather, "Who
should make the decision?" So long as the decision-maker does not disserve the
patient or society's interest in the patient's welfare-that is, so long as the choice
is made in good faith and is one that society is prepared to accept as medically
reasonable-compassion dictates that the decision-making process be as speedy,
as humane, and as respectful of both patient and family privacy as the medical
situation will allow.197
of "recast[ing] the state's interest in life as an interest in the quality of life" and characterizing
Missouri's interest in life as "unqualified"); In re Westchester County Medical Ctr.
(O'Connor), 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988) (third party decision-making is "unacceptable
because it is inconsistent with our fundamental commitment to the notion that no person or
court should substitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of life for
another"); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 463 (Wash. 1987) (Goodloe, J., dissenting) (objecting to
"the majority's obvious judgment that Barbara's life is not of value" and to the authorization
of a guardian "to determine that the ward's life is not worth living because the guardian deems
that 'life' to be negligible").
193. In addition to cases cited supra note 192, see James Bopp, Jr., Choosing Death for
Nancy Cruzan, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 42; James Bopp, Jr. & Thomas J.
Marzen, Cruzan: Facing the Inevitable, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 37 (1991); Kamisar,
supra note 189.
194. BUcHANAN & BROCK, supra note 166, at 126-32; Dresser, supra note 121, at 383-
84; Dresser & Robertson, supra note 142, at 241-42; Robertson, supra note 166, at 1157-59;
Robertson, supra note 172, at 1246-47. Cf. Rhoden, supra note 122, at 397-401 (noting that
under an objective analysis of benefits and burdens, permanently unconscious persons have no
interests).
195. Cranford, supra note 1, at 31;Am- Acad of Neurology, supra note 170, at 125.
196. Some courts have begun to make this observation. In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 425
(NJ. 1987) (characterizing a benefit/burden analysis as "essentially impossible" with respect
to PVS patients, as they do not experience either); accord, hI re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 443 (NJ,
1987) (citing the reasoning of In re Peter as grounds for distinguishing cases involving PVS
patients from all others).
197. For a thorough and strong argument that guardians who had a "bonded" (i.e.,
generally familial) relationship with their wards prior to the guardianship should be allowed to
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These concerns point firmly to the parents of a diagnosed PVS minor, act-
ing in good faith, as the appropriate persons to make treatment decisions for the
child, just as they would be entitled to do with respect to most other decisions
regarding the child's health and welfare.198 Our underlying societal assumptions,
expressed by the Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R.,199 that parents can generally
be expected to have their child's best interests at heart, and that they are better
situated to evaluate those interests than is any judge, guardian ad litem, or other
third party,200 should apply in this context just as in others. Even if we think that
the occasional parent might make a withdrawal-of-treatment decision on grounds
that most of us would not approve, appropriate legislative safeguards can help to
protect against that occurrence. Judicial intervention, with its attendant costs,
delays, and intrusion into family privacy, is too high a price to pay to try to "get
it right" every time.20 1 Judges themselves make mistakes; the judicial process is a
blunt instrument for dealing with these delicate and highly personal matters.
Therefore, resort to a court is unwarranted unless parents disagree or unless
involved parties have reason to suspect a disqualifying factor. Withdrawal of life
support systems from a PVS child is a medically reasonable course of action.
That parental choice, standing alone, is therefore not sufficient to trigger tradi-
tional safeguards against abuse or neglect or to call into question the presence of
good faith underlying the decision.
3. Withdrawal of Treatment Is a Medically Reasonable Choice
The reasonableness of a decision to withdraw life support systems from a
PVS patient is attested to simply by the number of cases permitting that course of
action20 2 and by the volume of legislation establishing procedures to permit that
choice.203 At least in its official statements, the medical community has long
recognized termination of treatment, including the withdrawal of artificial nutri-
tion and hydration, to be an appropriate response when the PVS patient has been
reliably diagnosed.2 04
Indeed, the past few years have seen an interesting reversal in the positions
of some members of the legal and medical professions towards treatment of PVS
patients. Existing court cases, legislation, and scholarly commentary have com-
monly pitted the rights of patients and their proxies or surrogates to make treat-
make refusal-of-treatment decisions within a discretionary realm bounded by "medical
reasonableness," see Veatch, supra note 122. Veatch states that this approach "protects the
patient, acknowledges the importance of familial responsibility, and avoids involving the
courts in most routine cases." Id at 443-44.
198. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
199. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
200. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
201. Cf. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 166, at 88-89: "Even if a surrogate ought to
try to act in the incompetent's best interest, requiring success in this effort is too stringent....
Although parents ought primarily to be guided by what is best for their children, it is generally
recognized that it would be intolerably intrusive to intervene to transfer custody whenever
doing so would result in a net increase of benefit to the child. The fact that another, wealthier
couple could provide a better education is not a sufficient reason for removing a child from his
or her natural parents, even if this could be done without psychological harm to the child."
202. See RIGHr-TO-DIE COURT DECISIONs, supra note 3.
203. See REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 4. The statutes typically
allow the withdrawal decision to be made by a competent patient contemplating future
possibilities or by a proxy decision-maker designated by the patient or by the legislature.
204. See AMA COUNCIL STATEMENT, supra note 170; Am. Acaat of Neurology, supra
note 170. See also Guidelines, supra note 170..
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ment withdrawal decisions against the perceived bias of health care providers to
maintain life under any conditions.205 Recently, however, some health care
providers have done an about-face and have aggressively advocated withdrawal
of life support systems from PVS patients on the grounds that any other course of
action is futile or inhumane.
This new posture in the termination-of-treatment debate came to the pub-
lic's attention with the case of Mrs. Helga Wanglie,206 who suffered respiratory
failure followed by "severe and irreversible brain damage" after she fell and
broke her hip.207 When attempts to wean Mrs. Wanglie from the respirator failed,
the Hennepin County Medical Center finally urged the family to discontinue
treatment as "no longer serving the patient's personal medical interest" and as
therefore "inappropriate." 208 When the family insisted that all forms of treatment
be continued, citing Mrs. Wanglie's views and their own religious and personal
values, the hospital petitioned a court for permission to discontinue life support.
The court refused and upheld the family's request; the hospital decided not to
appeal, and Mrs. Wanglie died shortly thereafter.209 The case paved the way,
however, for a health care provider's argument that it should not be legally re-
quired to provide care deemed medically inappropriate by the physicians in
charge.
The Georgia case of In re Doe210 presented a similai issue. There, the par-
ents of a thirteen-year-old child diagnosed as "varying between stupor and
coma ' 211 were unable to agree even on consent to a DNR order; both refused to
authorize withdrawal of life support systems. The Scottish Rite Hospital for
Crippled Children in Atlanta petitioned the trial court to permit withdrawal of
treatment on the grounds that life support maintenance was "abusive and inhu-
mane."212 This assessment was shared by three attending physicians, the hospi-
tal's Bioethics Committee, and two examining disinterested physicians.21 3 The
trial court concluded that, in the face of parental disagreement, it could not order
termination of treatment but must "yield to the presumption in favor of life."
2 14
On appeal, the hospital's only question was whether it should follow the
205. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 122. Dresser believes that Rhoden exaggerates "the
physician's overwhelming desire to preserve life," noting that currently "medical norms
governing life-sustaining treatment are in flux." Dresser, supra note 166, at 435-36.
206. In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Hennepin County filed Feb. 8,
1991).
207. Ronald E. Cranford, Helga Wanglie's Ventilator, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-
Aug. 1991, at 23. See also Felicia Ackerman, The Significance of a Wish, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 27; Daniel Callahan, Medical Futility, Medical Necessity: The-
Problem-Without-A-Name, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 30; Michael A. Rie,
The Limits ofa Wish, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 24.
208. Cranford, supra note 207, at 23.
209. Joan Beck, Death and Dying: More People Fight to Stay in Control, CHICAGO
TRIB., Aug. 26, 1991, at 17; Tom Majeski, Judge Refuses to Let Hospital Unplug Patient, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, July 2,1991, at IA.
210. No. D-93064 (Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton County Oct. 17, 1991), affd, 418 S.E.2d 3
(Ga. 1992).
211. 418 S.E.2d at 4. Although Jane Doe's diagnosis was not PVS but rather "a
degenerative neurological disease," characterized by a brain stem that was "shrinking or
degenerating," id., her case presents the same questions as those under consideration in this
article.
212. No. D-93064, slip op. at 5 (Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton County Oct. 17, 1991), aff'd, 418
S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992).
213. Id. slip op. at 6.
214. Id. slip op. at 18.
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mother's wishes and enter the DNR order, or whether it must abstain because the
father did not agree. The court ruled that the father had a right to revoke the
order, hence, the hospital could not act.215
As Doe and Wanglie demonstrate, a number of health care providers have
abandoned their bias against withdrawal of treatment. Indeed, some argue that
withdrawal is the only medically reasonable course of action. The issues thus
raised appear certain to become increasingly prevalent, not only in courts but in
legislatures. 216 For example, the Virginia legislature, in a recent amendment to
the state's Health Care Decisions Act, included a "futility clause" relieving
physicians from any requirement to provide medical treatment "that the physi-
cian determines, in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment, would neither
promote nor improve the health of the patient nor alleviate the patient's suffer-
ing."2 17 While this clause has not been construed in any reported court opinion, it
seems to codify the legislature's belief that withdrawal of treatment is medically
reasonable under certain circumstances.
It is clearly beyond the scope of this Article to engage in the emerging
"medical futility" debate.218 For present purposes, the relevance of the issue is
simply to underscore the medical reasonableness of a choice by parents to termi-
nate life support systems for their PVS minor child. So long as the decision is
made in good faith, it poses no basis for a finding of parental neglect or abuse,
the usual necessary predicate for governmental intrusion into parental decision-
making for minor children.
4. Values Served by the Good Faith Standard
Application of a simple "good faith" standard to parental choice, accom-
panied by appropriate safeguards against disqualifying factors, clearly serves the
values of family privacy and parental autonomy long protected under both the
common law and under constitutional doctrine. Because our societal institutions
are based on the presumption that parents will act in the best interests of their
children and indeed are the parties best situated to perceive those best interests, it
follows that a good faith standard serves the value that we place on the individual
child's welfare as well. The occasional exception does not disprove this premise;
it simply points up the need for permitting a health care provider concerned with
the child's welfare to raise the good faith issue and demand resort to court inter-
vention when there is reason to doubt that the standard has been met in a particu-
lar instance of parental decision-making.
A legislatively imposed good faith standard in this context serves the
state's legitimate interests. Case law traditionally identifies four state interests in
215. 418 S.E.2d at 7.
216. Some commentators would support judicial or legislative action actually requiring
cessation of treatment. Based on his position that permanently unconscious patients have no
interests, Robertson argues that state policy could constitutionally withhold public or private
insurance from these patients or could define irreversible coma as brain death. Robertson,
supra note 166, at 1197-99. Another view is that distributive justice concerns make it very
difficult to justify use of limited health care resources on life support systems for PVS patients.
See Baruch Brody, Special Ethical Issues in the Management of PVS Patients, 20 LAW, MED.
& HEALTH CARE 104 (1992).
217. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie 1991), as amended by 1992 Va. Acts ch.
748.
218. See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 207.
1993]
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
any termination-of-treatment decision: "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the pro-
tection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and
(4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 219 Invariably,
courts cite preservation of life as the primary value implicated.220 This interest
involves "two separate concerns: an interest in the prolongation of the life of the
individual patient and an interest in the sanctity of life itself."22' Most courts find
that factors favoring the right of a guardian or family member to decide to with-
draw treatment from a PVS patient outweigh these state interests, even when the
patient was never competent or never expressed preferences relevant to the situa-
tion.222 This value judgment in favor of privacy also underlies state statutes that
permit surrogate decision-making; in the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill
Act, it finds expression in the good faith standard.
Besides the state interests traditionally identified in cases concerning
withdrawal-of-treatment decisions, there are legitimate societal concerns in the
establishment of decision-making processes that serve the welfare of our primary
social institution, the family. Interests in the efficient administration of the judi-
cial process and in the wise allocation of governmental resources are also at
stake. We should not employ unnecessarily the machinery of courts, guardians ad
litem, and social service agencies in situations where judges are not equipped to
serve as the best decision-makers. 223 Only when a minor child's parents are inca-
pable of a mutual good faith decision is the public interest served by judicial
intervention in these cases.
219. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425
(Mass. 1977) (the first case to enumerate the four concerns). See also, e.g., In re Brophy, 497
N.E.2d 626, 634 (Mass. 1986); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984); In re Farrell,
529 A.2d 404, 410-11 (NJ. 1987); li re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983). Cf. Cruzan
v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988) (citing "prevention of homicide" as well as
suicide). See also DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at 31-32.
220. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988). See also cases cited supra
note 219.
221. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419.
222. The courts of Missouri and New York are the only exceptions. See supra note 82
and accompanying text.
223. Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979), quoting In re Roger S., 569 P.2d
1286, 1289 (Cal. 1977) (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that judges are not as equipped as
psychiatrists to render psychiatric judgments, see supra note 99 and accompanying text); In re
Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 449 (N.J. 1987) (withdrawal-of-treatment decision for PVS patient)
("'No matter how expedited, judicial intervention in this complex and sensitive area may take
too long. Thus, it could infringe the very rights that we want to protect"') (quoting In re
Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (NJ. 1987)).
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5. The Special Problem of the Minor Who Has Expressed an Opinion24
Section 7 of the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act qualifies its good
faith standard with the stipulation that "A [surrogate's] consent [to withdrawal of
treatment] is not valid if it conflicts with the expressed intention of the individ-
ual."225 Where the patient was once competent, it would be a logical contradic-
tion of "good faith" for a surrogate to make a decision directly counter to the
patient's previously expressed desires. If incorporated into a valid advance direc-
tive, those wishes would without question govern.226 Part of the rationale of
Section 7 is that the patient's choices, where known, should not lose all force
simply because of her failure to formalize a prior declaration or because a prior
declaration might be ineffective.
2 27
Should the same reasoning apply where an older minor has expressed
thoughtful views about whether she would want treatment terminated under
appropriate medical conditions? Psychological evidence indicates that "children
by age fourteen or fifteen usually have developed the various capacities neces-
sary for competence in health care decision-making to a level roughly compara-
ble to that attained by most adults." 228 States commonly permit older minors to
make some kinds of medical decisions, 229 and constitutional protections accorded
procreative liberties extend to minors as well as adults.230
Different considerations apply to treatment decisions for PVS patients,
however. Generally, policy permitting minors to consent to their own medical
treatment is actually premised not on the child's competence, but on the desire to
encourage minors to seek treatment in instances where they might be'reluctant to
consult parents (for instance, substance abuse, venereal disease, contraception,
224. As a personal note, I would like to clarify that my conclusions in this section are
not based on any perception that older minors are incapable of thoughtful decision-making on
end-of-life treatment issues. My husband and I have two teenagers whose intelligence and
judgment we respect enormously. We have discussed these matters with them, are aware of
their thinking, and would expect to follow their wishes if the need should arise and the law
would permit. Rather, I base my conclusions in this article on respect for family privacy in
decision-making and the realities of relevant legal considerations. All states that provide for
advance directives require legal competency, meaning age of majority. If an older minor (not
legally competent to execute a binding directive) were to have expressed a desire for treatment
withdrawal under certain circumstances, but the minor's parents were unwilling to execute a
parental directive in accordance with those wishes, I do not believe that any health care
provider or any court in this country would consider termination of treatment over parental
objection. On the other hand, if the minor had expressed a desire to continue treatment,
perhaps based on hopes that, given enough time, a restorative cure might be found, I do not
think that the minor's parents should forever be saddled with expectations that are
demonstrably unrealistic. Therefore, I advocate leaving the final decision to the minor's
parents, if they agree, unless a legislature chooses to lower the age at which a person can
execute a valid advance directive.
225. Unif. Rights of the Terminally Ill Act § 7(d), 9B U.L.A. 96 (Supp. 1989).
226. Id.§§2,3.
227. Id. § 7, comment: "Prior declarations might not be effective for a variety of reasons,
including for example the expiration of a time limit, the failure to have the declaration properly
witnessed, or the absence of a condition precedent contained in the declaration, stich as the
death or disability of a designated decision-maker." The appropriateness of deference to a
patient's stated intentions is underscored by the comment's observation that the surrogate's
consent "will be treated as if the individual had given it." Id.
228. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 166, at 222-23.
229. See supra notes 88-89, and note 91 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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and abortion). 231 Although independent parental interests in bringing up their
children as they see fit232 are clearly implicated in these situations, those interests
are deemed to be outweighed by the minors' own privacy rights and by the social
desirability of providing them with access to appropriate medical treatment.2 33
When a child has been diagnosed as a PVS patient, the balance shifts. Her
rights of confidentiality are not at issue. Her interest in self-determination may be
worthy of respect, although, as noted earlier, some analysts see PVS patients as
no longer possessing independent interests of their own.2 34 On the other hand, her
parents' interests in her welfare and in her appropriate treatment are beyond
question. They (and other family members) are profoundly affected by her situa-
tion. They are also the parties whom social policy traditionally trusts to act in her
best interests. They are more likely than anyone else to be aware of her values,
particularly inasmuch as they have been the chief inculcators of those values.2 35
Under these circumstances, if the minor child has expressed views on the issue,
the underlying premise should be that her parents can be counted upon to take
those views into account-and to accord them appropriate weight236 -in reach-
ing their own decision.
The suggestion here, therefore, is that when parents mutually agree upon
termination of treatment for their PVS minor child, their decision should nor-
mally govern, without the need for judicial permission. If the child has expressed
contrary intentions, that factor alone should not defeat the right of parental
choice. In some situations, the child's known contrary views may constitute
appropriate grounds for questioning the parents' good faith and may therefore
provide a basis for an appropriate party to seek court intervention. Nonetheless, a
minor's expressed opposition should not be an automatic trigger evidencing bad
faith unless the legislature has chosen to lower the age at which a person may
make a valid prior declaration.
On the other hand, whenever judicial resolution is sought on the grounds
of parental disagreement, or whenever both parents are disqualified, 237 the
thoughtfully expressed views of an older minor are entitled to substantial proba-
tive weight. Third parties making decisions on behalf of minors will undoubtedly
employ some version of a "substituted judgment"/"best interests" analysis, and
either approach would make a mature child's known views highly relevant, if
not, in fact, decisive.23 8 The opinion of this Article is that the "best interest"
standard, which usually governs the state's exercise of its parens palriae power,
is preferable to the fiction of attributing "judgment" to one who was never
231. BUcHANAN & BROCK, supra note 166, at 241. See also Holder, supra note 35,
§ 19.01[3][a], [b].
232. See supra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (protecting minors'
right of access to contraceptive devices).
234. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
235. Accord, BUcHANAN & BROCK, supra note 166, at 233-34.
236. This does not necessarily mean decisive weight. For the view that the interests of
other family members may appropriately be taken into account in making a withdrawal-of-
treatment decision for a PVS patient, see Rhoden, supra note 122, at 394-96; Veatch, supra
note 122, at 436-38.
237. For a discussion of disqualifying factors justifying court intervention, see supra
notes 105-32 and accompanying text.




legally competent to exercise it.239 If a court follows that suggestion, it will
accord considerable weight, but not total deference, to the minor patient's known
attitudes. In any event, however, those attitudes should not be permitted to over-
ride a mutual parental choice where no bad faith or other disqualifying character-
istic is shown.
Ii. MECHANISMS FOR PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING
A. The Need for Legislation
Both the common law240 and the constitutionally protected right to pri-
vacy 24 1 already invest in parents certain rights to make medical decisions on
behalf of their minor children. Arguably, principles derived from these sources
alone encompass a right to make treatment withdrawal decisions on behalf of
minor children in a persistent vegetative state. Yet no court to date has defined
parental rights so broadly 2 42 The rights of parents must always yield to suffi-
ciently important state interests;24 3 certainly, the state's parens patriae power to
protect the welfare of children 2 " permits it to intervene when the issue is so sub-
stantial as the difference between life and death for a child.
45
More successful arguments, grounded in the-common law right of
informed consent to medical treatment,U6 the constitutionally protected right of
privacy,247 or a combination of the two,248 have been mounted on" behalf of
incompetent patients, including minors, to permit surrogates to make refusal-of-
treatment decisions that the patients are unable to make for themselves. Courts
which permit surrogate decision-making have on occasion constructed elaborate
frameworks to guide the actions of lower courts, of health care providers, and of
potential surrogates who may find themselves faced with a painful situation in
relation to a close family member.249 Courts, however, have a limited ability,
239. See supra notes 164-88 and accompanying text (comparing the two approaches).
240. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
242. Le., no court has to date defined parental rights qua parental rights as including the
right to withdraw treatment from a PVS minor child. Rather, courts considering these cises
have substantially relied upon the child's rights and the "substituted judgment" doctrine. See
supra nqtes 45-73 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 188 andaccompanying text.
245. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1989) ("Where the health care issues
are potentially life threatening, the State's parens patriae interest is greater than if the health
care matter is less consequential").
246. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (Ct. App. 1983); In re
Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (Il. 1989); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951-52 (Me. 1987);
Eichner v. Dillon, 420 N.E.2d 64,70-71 (N.Y. 1981).
247. The Supreme Court indicated that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical care, including life-sustaining
treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-80 (1990); see supra
notes 8081 and accompanying text. See also In re Sevems, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del. 1980);
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923-24 (Fla. 1984); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,662-64 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
248. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 214-16, 741 P.2d 674, 681-83
(1987); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 242 (Mass.
1977); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 741-43 (Wash. 1983).
249. With respect to minors, see, e.g., In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (Ga. 1984)
(parents or guardian of minor may decide after diagnosis is confirmed by two physicians
otherwise unrelated to the case); In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
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within the confines of any one case, to anticipate future factual variations which
may present essentially the same question in a slightly different guise. Nor is that
their function.
Pleas for legislation to answer the agonizing questions of parents and other
close relatives, of health care providers, and of the courts themselves abound in
decisions dealing with the withholding or withdrawal of life support systems
from incompetent patients.250 An abundance of legislation has in fact been
passed, particularly dealing with advance directives.251 A number of states have
also begun to appreciate the need for surrogate/family decision-making statutes;
however, most of these are inadequate to answer the questions posed by the situa-
tion of parents wishing to terminate medical treatment for a minor child in a per-
sistent vegetative state.252 State legislatures should act to confrontthis problem
directly, in a manner designed to ensure that family tragedies may be dealt with
as privately, expeditiously, and humanely as possible, while at the same time
protecting the interests of both parents and their minor children.
B. Necessary Safeguards: A Proposal
1. A Written Parental Directive
Absent disqualifying criteria, 53 a conflict between the two parents, or
other grounds for a reasonable suspicion of bad faith,25 the parents of a minor
child in a persistent vegetative state should be legislatively enabled to execute a
valid directive to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, so long as their
judgment is supported by a reliable medical diagnosis and prognosis. The mech-
anism of a solemnly executed directive, generally requiring two witnesses, is the
(medical diagnosis must be confirmed by at least two physicians; advisory committee
recommended); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015, 1020-21 (La. 1982) (child's right may be
judicially asserted either after or before the event; court's primary role is to ensure appropriate
safeguards and underlying conditions; juvenile court has jurisdiction). Cases involving
incompetent adults include Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 433-35 (Mass. 1977) (probate court should appoint a guardian and, when
necessary, a guardian ad litem, make appropriate findings of incompetency, and apply
substituted judgment test; judge may consider views of ethics committees, but may not shift
decision-making responsibility away from court); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1237-42 (NJ.
1985) (detailed procedure prescribed where patient is non-comatose incompetent adult in a
nursing home); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670-72 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)
(court-appointed guardian may decide after physician's diagnosis and prognosis are confirmed
by a prognosis committee); id. at 668-69 (general hospital ethics committees are
recommended); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 749-51 (Wash. 1983) (similar to Quinlan;
prognosis board must include at least two physicians otherwise unrelated to the case).
250. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 225, 741 P.2d 674, 692 (1987);
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488 (Ct. App. 1983); Severns v. Wilmington
Medical Ctr., 421 A.2d 1334, 1346 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla.
1980); In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 301 (Ill. 1989); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 449-50
(NJ. 1987) (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (NJ. 1985)); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74
(N.Y. 1981); In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1379 (Wash. 1984).
251. See REFUSAL OFTREATMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 4.
252. Twenty-four jurisdictions currently have some form of surrogate/family decision-
making statute. However, only six of these clearly include minors within their purview. See
supra note 21.
253. For a discussion of disqualifying criteria (incompetency, conflict of interest,
suspected abuse or neglect), see supra notes 105-32 and accompanying text.
254. An older minor's expressed contrary views might be one grounds for alleging bad




pattern of a number of the surrogate/family decision-making statutes that now
exist.255 This mirrors the common requirements for a competent patient's execu-
tion of a valid advance directive 256 and reflects the fact that a surrogate is deemed
to stand in the stead of the patient, who simply failed to act while still competent.
The rationale of this Article suggests that parents of a minor child should
not be looked upon as the child's "surrogates," strictly speaking,257 but rather as
the adult persons responsible for medical decision-making on her behalf, so long
as the child is legally incapable of deciding for herself. Whichever underlying
theory a legislature finds persuasive, the formality of a signed, witnessed docu-
ment helps to ensure that the actors have given their decision due consideration
and appreciate its weight. Furthermore, a validly executed directive serves as
proof to insulate from potential civil or criminal liability health care providers
who rely on it in good falth.258 As with advance directives executed by patients
while competent, health care providers should be entitled to assume the compe-
tency of those executing the document.259 Only if they become aware of facts
which would put a reasonable person on notice of incompetence, conflict of
interest, abuse or neglect, disagreement between the parents, or other indication
of bad faith should health care providers be held accountable for failure to act in
good faith themselves when carrying out a validly executed parental directive. If
any of the medical personnel directly connected with the patient's care should
255. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214 (Michie Supp. 1991) (providing that
declaration executed on behalf of an incompetent patient is to be same in form as those
executed in advance by a competent patient under § 20-17-202); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.58.5(B) (Supp. 1992) (requiring written documentation and presence of at least two
witnesses); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-707(a) (West Supp. 1991) (requiring written
documentation and presence of at least two witnesses); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 672.006 (West Supp. 1992) (implying written documentation and presence of at least two
witnesses in provision providing for "execution of directive on behalf of patient younger than
18 years of age"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107 (1991) (requiring written concurrence
along with presence and signatures of at least two witnesses). But see CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 19a-571 (Supp. 1991) (making no mention of written documentation or witnesses); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 21-2210 (1989) (silent as to written documentation and requiring presence of
only one witness); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-21 (Supp. 1991) (including no reference to
written documentation or witnesses); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West 1989) (providing for
written agreement but requiring presence of only one witness); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.58.6 (Supp. 1992) (requiring written documentation but excluding any specific
reference to witnesses, in contrast to adult surrogate decision-making provision
§ 40:1299.58.5); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-4, -7 (Michie 1991) (making no reference to
written documentation or witnesses); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1990 & Supp. 1991)
(making no mention of written documentation or witnesses); OR. REV. STAT § 127.635 (1991)
(silent as to written documentation and witnesses); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (1991)
(requiring presence of at least two witnesses but silent as to written documentation); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.009 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring presence of at least
two witnesses but silent as to need for written documentation).
256. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-202(a) (Michie Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-321(c)(3) (1990 & Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.610(2) (1991).
257. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 2302 (3d ed. 1986) lists
the first definition for "surrogate" as "a person appointed to act in place of another." This
concept suggests the substituted judgment test and appears properly applicable when a person
was once competent. This Article suggests that is not the appropriate analysis where a minor
child is concerned.
258. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.9 (West 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.630.1
(1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1114 (1991).
259. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(B) (1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
2426(b) (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-15 (Burns 1990 & Supp. 1992).
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become aware of a disqualifying characteristic in one or both of the parents, that
person should have standing to refer the matter for expedited court resolution.
2. A Confirmed Medical Diagnosis and Prognosis
The key to the validity of parental decision-making under this proposal is a
confirmed diagnosis of persistent vegetative state and prognosis of no reasonable
chance of return to consciousness. The diagnosis and prognosis should come
from the patient's treating physician. Because of the seriousness and irreversibil-
ity of any decision to withhold or withdraw life support systems, both surro-
gate/family decision-making statutes260 and courts dealing with the issue 261 have
required that the treating physician's judgments be well confirmed. An indepen-
dent evaluation from a second examining physician, competent to render the
diagnosis and otherwise unconnected with the case, should serve to-provide the
necessary confirmation. The evaluations should be independently entered into the
patient's records in written form. These written records can serve as proof to
insulate from potential civil or criminal liability both the parents who rely on
them in good faith in executing a refusal-of-treatment directive and others
(medical personnel or members of ethics committees, perhaps) who rely on them
in good faith in advising the parents or in carrying out the terms of a directive.
As with all their professional actions, the physicians' evaluations should meet the
standards of accepted medical practice.
3. The Role of Ethics Committees
Increasingly, hospitals and other health care providers name ethics com-
mittees, often consisting of both medical personnel -and members of the local
community.262 In fact, current accreditation standards promulgated by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations require hospitals to
have in place "a mechanism(s) for the consideration of ethical issues arising in
the care of patients and to provide education to caregivers and patients on ethical
issues in health care" '263 The mission and workings of ethics committees vary,
but their most likely functions are policy formulation and education. 264 In some
institutions, committee members may be called upon to consult in individual
patient-care decisions. In these consultations, the committee may simply serve as
260. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para 851-20(e) (Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-7-5 (Michie 1991); Thx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.009 (West 1992).
261. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
262. See generally AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS'N, REPORT OFTHE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON BIOMEDICAL ISSUES, VALUES IN CONFLICT: RESOLVING ETHICAL ISSUES IN HOSPITAL
CARE (1985), at 30-35 [hereinafter AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASs'N]; ETHICS CONSULTATION IN
HEALTH CARE (John C. Fletcher et al. eds., 1989); INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND
HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING (Ronald E. Cranford & A. Edward Doudera eds., 1984)
[hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES]; JUDITH WILSON ROSS ET AL.,
HANDBOOK FOR HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMITTEES (1986). See also THE HASTINGS CENTER,
supra note 108, at 99-105 (suggesting guidelines for ethics committees); DECIDING TO
FOREGO, supra note 108, at 160-70 (describing current practices and making
recommendations).
263. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS,
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1992).
264. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS'N, supra note 262, at 33-34; THE HASTINGS
CENTER, supra note 108, at 100-04; DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at 162-63; ROSS
ET AL., supra note 262, at 49-56.
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a sounding board for airing the issues, or it may take a more active role, and offer
advice to relevant decision-makers. 2 65
Some courts have suggested that refusal-of-treatment decisions should be
made in consultation with ethics committees, although most of them stop short of
imposing such a requirement. 266 If competent parents are the appropriate
decision-makers for their minor children, the only requirement for a valid direc-
tive should be basically uncontrovertible medical evidence. Any other require-
ment undercuts the hypothesis that parents are appropriate decision-makers who
generally act in their children's best interests-the beginning presumption of
Parham v. J.R.267
Of course, parents should feel free to consult health care provider ethics
committees, where they exist and are available for individual consultation.
Undoubtedly, such a group could offer valuable advice and support to parents
facing an extremely difficult decision under the most trying of circumstances.
Courts often note that termination-of-treatment decisions have been made after
consultation with moral or ethical advisors, such as other family members,
clergy, or ethics committees. 269 To require that such committees exist and that
their approval be necessary in the decisions at issue here, however, would be to
create a situation inviting delay, irresolution, and, eventually, resort to courts in
the face of disagreement. 269 It might also raise questions of potential liability on
the part of ethics committee members for decisions carried out with their
265. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL AWS'N, supra note 262, at 34-35; THE HASTINGS
CENTER, supra note 108, at 104-05; DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at 163-65; John
A. Robertson, Committees as Decision Makers: Alternative Structures and Responsibilities, in
INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES, supra note 262, at 85; Ross ET AL., supra note 262, at
32-33. For discussions of specific institutional experiences, see Troyen A. Brennan, Ethics
Committees and Decisions to Limit Care: The Experience at the Massachusetts General
Hospital, 260 JAMA 803 (1988); Diane E. Hoffmann, Does Legislating Hospital Ethics
Committees Make a Difference? A Study of Hospital Ethics Committees in Maryland, the
District of Columbia, and Virginia, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 105 (1991); Katherine
Bouton, Painful Decisions: The Role of the Medical Ethicist, N.Y. TMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 5,
1990, at 22 (describing the work of ethicist Ruth Macklin at Albert Einstein College of
Medicine).
266. The idea that consultation with a hospital ethics committee might actually be
required before withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment stems from In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647,671 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), where the court ordered Karen's guardian,
family, and attending physicians to consult such a body before carrying out their own mutual
decision. The function ascribed by the court to the committee, however, was not one of ethical
decision-making but simply a confirmation of the prognosis that Karen had no reasonable hope
of return to a sapient state. Elsewhere, the court discussed the advantages of ethics committees
established to help share the responsibility by advising patients, families, and medical
personnel. Id. at 668-69. Cf. In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(recommending availability of advisory committee); In re Tones, 357 N.W.2d 332, 335-36 &
n.2 (Minn. 1984) (citing views of ethics committees where conservator was non-family
member); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 749-50 (Wash. 1983) (requiring unanimous
confirmation of diagnosis by a "prognosis board").
267. 442 U.S. 584 (1979); accord, In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 723 (Ga. 1984).
268. See, e.g., In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re
Rosebush, No. 88 349180 AZ, slip op. at 4-5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Oakland County, July 29, 1988),
appealfiled, No. 111082 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 657-60 (NJ.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
269. See DEcIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 108, at 165. Others have also expressed the
need for caution in assessing the appropriate role of ethics committees vis-d-vis prospective
case review. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS'N, supra note 262, at 30-32, 35; Ross Er AL.,
supra note 262, at 56-63.
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approva 27o This possibility would surely have a chilling effect on recruitment of
committee members and, by creating a stake in outcomes, inhibit members'
abilities to serve as concerned but disinterested sounding boards or advisors to
troubled families. Thus, while the existence of ethics committees is to be encour-
aged, they properly have no official role in the decision itself.
4. The Appropriate Scope of Parental Decision-Making Authority:
The Mature Minor and the Patient Incapacitated as a Minor
For reasons already stated,271 the thesis that parents are the appropriate
decision-makers for their PVS minor child should hold true even where a mature
minor has expressed her own preferences. Unless a legislature chooses to lower
the age of autonomous decision-making for refusal-of-treatment cases, any other
rule creates an impasse in which the concerned parties are powerless to act. Only
when parents disagree, or are perceived to be acting in bad faith, and as a conse-
quence the issue in fact receives a judicial hearing, should the child's preferences
receive probative weight. In the event that the court must choose the views of
one parent over the other, clear and convincing proof of deliberative statements
from a child of demonstrable maturity may well deserve careful consideration. In
the final analysis, however, the court should be guided by the criterion of the
child's best interests.
The same considerations suggest that when the incapacitating event or ill-
ness occurs while the child is a minor, parents should not lose their decision-
making authority just because the child turns eighteen years of age, even if the
diagnosis of persistent vegetative state is not made until after the age of majority.
A different rule leads to the kind of seemingly unresolvable dilemma evi-
dent in the situation of Christine Busalacchi. 272 If the patient has never been
capable of making her own decisions or of stating preferences to which the
state's courts are willing to accord "clear and convincing" weight, her parents
should be empowered to make the decision.
5. The Appropriate Role of the Courts
Enactment of legislation clarifying the rights of parents to make refusal-of-
treatment decisions for their minor children in medically appropriate circum-
stances would eliminate a number of needless time-consuming and expensive
court hearings. But of course, situations would still arise where judicial interven-
tion would be necessary. If medical personnel involved in the patient's care were
270. The Hastings Center recommends insurance coverage for all ethics committee
members. T1E HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 108, at 105.
271. See supra notes 233-39 (discussing the weight to be given a mature minor's
expression of opinion).
272. In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991), appeal
dismissed, 1993 WL 32356 (Mo. Jan. 26, 1993). See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying
text (discussing facts). Differing with the majority, the dissent expressed the view that Peter
Busalacchi's status as Christine's father was not irrelevant. Given the onset of her incapacity
while still a minor, Missouri law imposes on her father the obligation of parental support for
his lifetime. In the dissenting judge's view, he should therefore be accorded a parent's latitude
to make medical decisions on behalf of his daughter, including the right to take her elsewhere
for diagnosis and treatment. Id. at *8-9 (Smith, J., dissenting). Similar facts obtained in In re
Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991) (PVS patient, age 42 at time of parents' petition, was
nine when permanently brain damaged), and In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987) (22-year-
old patient was declared legally incompetent at age 14).
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to have reason to doubt the parents' competence or to suspect a conflict of inter-
est, abuse, or neglect, they should have standing to raise the issue before a court.
If the parents disagree, either could seek court resolution.
Once involved, a court would likely appoint a guardian ad litem to repre-
sent the child's interests by presenting appropriate information to the court con-
cerning the issues raised in the litigation. A threshold question would be whether
the court should invest any individual with decision-making authority, or
whether the judge should make the treatment decision. If the court were to find
that one parent should be disqualified, the appropriate course of action would be
to invest the other with sole decision-making power.273 If both parents were dis-
qualified or were unavailable, the appropriate question would be whether some-
one else had the kind of intimate relationship with the child that would justify
investing that person with the full panoply of parental authority suggested by this
Article (for example, a grandparent or an adult sibling).274
If there is no appropriate parent substitute, or in cases of parental dis-
agreement, the court should make the decision, based on an assessment of the
child's best interests.275 This conclusion rests on the fact that a court-appointed
guardian, no matter how conscientious, cannot be presumed to have the kind of
loving concern that justifies parental decision-making authority on the child's
behalf. Furthermore, if parents disagree, investment of decision-making power in
only one of them seems inevitably disruptive of marital and other familial rela-
tionships.276 Courts, therefore, have an appropriate role to play in withdrawal-of-
treatment decisions affecting minor children in a persistent vegetative state, but
only when there are sound reasons for finding that the usual presumptions favor-
ing good-faith parental decision-making do not apply.
IV. CONCLUSION
In most jurisdictions in this country, parents of a medically diagnosed PVS
minor child exist in legal limbo if they wish to bring closure to an intolerable sit-
uation by terminating life-sustaining treatment. Their instincts may tell them that
such a course of action is in their child's best interests: the unconscious child
receives no benefits from a respirator or a gastronomy tube, and her daily care
273. Cf. In re Baby Doe, No. D-62058 (Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton County Nov. 30, 1988)
(father suspected of abusing his PVS child; mother was permitted to make the withdrawal of
treatment decision).
274. This seems unlikely, unless the person were actually the child's primary caretaker
and therefore likely to have the kind of relationship with the child normally held by a parent.
275. This Article takes the position that the best interests standard is the most
appropriate in this situation. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. However, in
jurisdictions where the substituted judgment approach governs case law, a court could apply it
as well; as noted, the two standards may well lead to the same result in cases dealing with PVS
patients. See supra notes 176-87 and accompanying text.
276. If parents are separated or divorced and there are no other children in the family,
one can imagine that a court might find it appropriate to appoint the custodial parent to make
the decision. Otherwise, considerations of other family members' interests suggest the
desirability of taking the decision out of the hands of only one parent, where the other
disagrees. Cf. In re Doe, No. D-93064 (Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton County Oct. 17, 1991) (finding
that each parent has the same rights in relation to the child, and therefore it is not appropriate
to allow only one to decide; so long as there was disagreement, the court thought it necessary
to favor prolongation of life), afj'd, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992) (finding that under the Georgia
statute one parent may consent to a DNR order, but the other revoke it; the appeals court,
however, confined its discussion to custodial parents).
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necessarily involves a number of procedures that most of us would consider to be
indignities. Because the patient is a child, the situation could continue without
change for a number of years, placing an overwhelming burden of grief and help-
lessness on parents and other family members. Yet when the treating physician
and hospital personnel are consulted about the possibilities of withdrawing life
support systems, concerns about legal liability may well impel them to refuse
without the permission of a court order. Obtaining one is a costly, time-consum-
ing, and emotionally wearing process; the trial court may well refuse, and ap-
peals involve more expense and delay.
Only six states have enacted statutes specifically dealing with parental
decision-making for minors in this situation, and one of those requires court
supervision. Some other surrogate/family decision-making statutes are ambigu-
ous at best; even the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act is not clear on the
matter. What is needed is legislation clearly stating that in these circumstances
parents acting in good faith have the right to make refusal-of-treatment decisions
without judicial intervention. The only necessary predicate is the treating physi-
cian's medical diagnosis of persistent vegetative state and prognosis of no
reasonable hope of return to consciousness, confirmed by a qualified independent
physician. Only in a very narrow range of cases, where parents appear incompe-
tent or otherwise disqualified to make the decision, or where they disagree,
would resort to a court be needful or even appropriate. When judicial interven-
tion becomes necessary, the court should appoint a guardian ad litem to make a
recommendation and, absent an appropriate parental substitute, should decide
according to the standard of the child's best interests, the usual norm for applica-
tion of the state's parens patriae power on behalf of minors. This approach
respects the family values which undergird both the common law and our con-
cepts of the constitutionally protected right of privacy, while at the same time
protecting the individual rights of the minor child. It permits, where appropriate,
dignity to both the dying process and the family's grief.
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